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ABSTRACT 
JOGNIL SO: Essays on Political Connections and Firm Value 
(Under the direction of Paolo Fulghieri) 
 
 
One of the interesting topics in finance is the relationship between politics and firm value. In 
particular, many people have analyzed whether or not political connections add value to the firm.  
While previous studies addressed this question in the contexts of countries with weak legal systems, I 
attempt to study whether political connections are also important in non corrupted countries with a 
well functioning strong legal system.  
This thesis consists of two empirical studies on political connections and firm value. Chapter 
I analyzes whether politically connected boards affect firm value and then Chapter II explores the 
specifics of what are the benefits from political connections. 
More specifically, Chapter I explores whether political connections are also important in the 
United States. It uses an original hand-collected data set on the political connections of board 
members of S&P500 companies to sort companies into those connected to the Republican Party and 
those connected to the Democratic Party. The analysis shows a positive abnormal stock return 
following the announcement of the nomination of a politically connected individual to the board. The 
paper also analyzes the stock price response to the 2000 Presidential Election and finds that 
companies connected to the Republican Party increase in value while companies connected to the 
Democratic Party decrease in value.  
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
Chapter II analyzes whether political connections of public corporations in the United States 
affect the allocation of government procurement contracts. Using this classification, the study focuses 
on the change in control of both House and Senate following the 1994 midterm election and on the 
change in the Presidency following the 2000 election. An analysis of the change in the value of the 
procurement contracts awarded to these companies before and after 1994 and 2000, respectively, 
indicates that companies that are connected to the winning (losing) party are significantly more likely 
to experience an increase (decrease) in procurement contracts. In total, these findings suggest that the 
allocation of procurement contracts is influenced, at least in part, by political connections. Thus, this 
study provides one of the first pieces of evidence showing a direct avenue through which political 
connections add value to U.S. companies.  
 
  
 iv 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am grateful to my advisor Paolo Fulghieri as well as my committee members Eitan 
Goldman, Jorg Rocholl, Sergey Sanzhar and Merih Sevilir for their help and support. Special thanks 
to my co-authors Eitan Goldman and Jorg Rocholl for all their insightful discussions and 
encouragements. I would also like to thank my colleagues Bumjean Sohn, Heungju Park, Woo Sung 
Kang, and all my friends at UNC-Chapel Hill for all their advice and support throughout this PhD 
experience. 
I am thankful for the dedicated support of my wife, Eun-Jeong. Without her encouragement, 
this project would have been impossible. I am also deeply indebted to my parents, my parents in law, 
and other family member for their unwavering love and support.  
 
 
  
 v 
 
 
 
TABLE OF COTENTS 
 
Chapter I. Do Politically Connected Boards affect Firm Value?.............................................. 1 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1 
2. Data description .................................................................................................................................. 9 
2.1. Board data......................................................................................................................... 10 
2.2. Donation data ................................................................................................................... 12 
3. Empirical results ............................................................................................................................... 13 
3.1. Univariate results .............................................................................................................. 13 
       3.1.1. Board connection results ........................................................................................ 14 
       3.1.2. Donation results ...................................................................................................... 16 
3.2. Cross-sectional results ...................................................................................................... 16 
3.3. Nomination of politically connected board members....................................................... 19 
3.4. Further tests and robustness.............................................................................................. 25 
       3.4.1. Choice of event window ......................................................................................... 26 
       3.4.2. Industry clustering .................................................................................................. 27 
       3.4.3. Weighing of observations ....................................................................................... 28 
4. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 28 
 
Chapter 2. Political Connections and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts .................... 30 
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 30 
2. Data description ................................................................................................................................ 39 
2.1. Procurement data .............................................................................................................. 40 
2.2. Subsidiary data ................................................................................................................. 41 
2.3. Resulting sample .............................................................................................................. 41 
 
 vi 
 
 
2.4. Board data......................................................................................................................... 42 
3. Empirical Results ............................................................................................................................. 46 
3.1. Univariate Results ............................................................................................................ 47 
3.2. Multivariate results ........................................................................................................... 49 
4. Further tests and robustness.............................................................................................................. 54 
4.1. Choice of the dependent variable ..................................................................................... 54 
4.2. Type of companies and different trajectories ................................................................... 55 
4.3. Different types of political connections ........................................................................... 56 
4.4. First event period .............................................................................................................. 57 
5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 57 
 
REFERENCE ……………………………………………………………………………………….78 
 
 
  
 vii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Board connections……….…………………………………………….……………………………59 
Table 2: Donations ............................................................................................................................... 60 
Table 3: Post-Election CARs of S&P500 companies with board connections .................................... 61 
Table 4: Cross-sectional analysis of Post-Election CARs adjusted by the market index ..................... 62 
Table 5: Cross-sectional analysis of Post-Election CARs adjusted by Fama-French 30 industry returns
 .............................................................................................................................................................. 63 
Table 6: Timing of Nominations .......................................................................................................... 64 
Table 7: The announcement effect of the nomination of connected board members ........................... 65 
Table 8: Comparison of announcement effect to matching sample ..................................................... 66 
Table 9: Procurement awards of two sample companies ..................................................................... 67 
Table 10: Procurement awards in the United States between 1990 and 2004 ...................................... 68 
Table 11: Summary statistics for the sample companies ...................................................................... 69 
Table 12: Tenure and timing of nomination of political boards ........................................................... 70 
Table 13: Value of procurement contracts for sample companies ....................................................... 71 
Table 14: Summary statistics for the sample companies by categories ................................................ 72 
Table 15: Cross-section analysis for the change in procurement contracts of 1994 sample ................ 73 
Table 16: Cross-section analysis for the change in procurement contracts of 2000 sample ................ 74 
Table 17: Placebo event year test for the change in procurement contracts of 1997 sample ............... 75 
Table 18: Distribution of sample companies across the Fama-French 30 industries ........................... 76 
 
  
 viii 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of politically connected companies across the Fama-French 30 
industries ................................................................................................................................. 77 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter I. Do Politically Connected Boards affect Firm Value? 
 
1. Introduction 
In countries with a well functioning legal system, companies are not expected to receive a 
substantial competitive advantage or preferential treatment from their political connections.  Government 
officials with the power to affect the economic value of public companies would risk serious legal and 
political costs if they chose to help companies for private reasons rather than for reasons of public merit. 
While this argument should be true in general, anecdotal stories about the potential influence of 
political connections in the U.S. do exist.  For example, a 2004 AP news wire reports that “the Army 
awarded Vice President Dick Cheney's former company a contract Friday to rebuild Iraq's oil industry.  
Halliburton won a competitive bid to rebuild the oil industry in southern Iraq, a contract worth up to 
$ 1.2 billion over two years…”  On the other side of the political spectrum, a 2000 USA Today report 
says that “True powerbrokers such as Clinton confidante Vernon Jordan, who's listed on 10 boards, are 
considered a good fit for many boards. Jordan now is senior managing director at investment bank 
Lazard Freres. His wife, consultant Ann Dibble Jordan, is a director at Johnson & Johnson, Citigroup, 
Automatic Data Processing, three non-profit groups and, until they were acquired, Coleman and Salant.” 
The article goes on to claim that this phenomenon is becoming more and more prevalent: “Among 
Fortune 1,000 companies, about 55% have at least one director with public service experience, up from 
39% in 1992”. 
Although the political connections of board members can be beneficial both for innocuous 
reasons, such as providing knowledge about how to navigate government bureaucracies, and for less 
innocuous ones, it is nevertheless important to explore how pervasive is the impact of these connections 
on the value of publicly traded U.S. companies.  Thus, this paper attempts to investigate whether the 
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examples above merely represent isolated idiosyncratic cases in which politically connected boards may 
have affected value or whether they are the tip of the iceberg of a much larger widespread phenomenon.  
To address this question, the paper focuses on analyzing the value impact of political connections 
of major U.S. companies, including all companies in the S&P500. Testing for whether political 
connections impact value requires addressing two basic challenges. The first challenge is to identify and 
define a viable measure of political connections. Given a definition of political connections, the second 
challenge is to find a setting that would allow one to test whether they do indeed affect company value.  
To address the first challenge, the paper employs a unique definition of a company’s political 
connections based on new hand-collected data, detailing the former political positions held by each of the 
board members of all companies that are in the S&P500 during the years 1996 and 2000.1 Information 
about the political background of board members is then used to sort companies into those that are 
connected to the Democrats and those that are connected to the Republicans. 
To address the second challenge, the paper looks at two different events. The first is the 2000 
Presidential Election on November 7, 2000.2 The second is the announcement of the board nomination of 
all of the directors that are identified as having a political connection. The hypothesis is that if political 
connections matter then: 1) companies with political connections to the Republican Party will increase in 
value upon the Republican win while companies connected to the Democratic Party will suffer a drop in 
value; and 2) the nomination of a politically connected director to the board will result in an increase in 
firm value due to the revelation that this company is able to hire from a limited supply of politically 
connected individuals who have the ability to generate future political benefits.3  
                                                 
1
 There are of course other ways in which a company may get connected, e.g. through lobbyists or consultants. This implies that 
the number of politically connected companies identified in this study is a lower bound on the actual number of politically 
connected companies. 
 
2
 The election results can only be a viable event if the outcome of the election is uncertain. The 2000 election provides such an 
event as the polls suggest a very close race up to the election date, in contrast to the elections in 1992 and 1996. This is the 
reason why this paper, similar to other papers in the field of political economics, focuses on the 2000 election. 
 
3
 Further discussion of the theory and economic motivation behind this test is provided in Section 3.3.  
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 The first main result of the paper is that a portfolio of S&P500 companies classified as having a 
Republican board significantly outperforms in the post-election period a portfolio of S&P500 companies 
classified as having a Democratic board. This is true regardless of whether the portfolios are formed 
based on equal weighting or value weighting. A company is defined as having a Republican (Democratic) 
board if it has at least one board member who has a former affiliation to the Republicans (Democrats) but 
no such member with ties to the Democrats (Republicans). The results also show that, considered 
separately, the Republican portfolio exhibits a positive and significant cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
following the election. Conversely, the Democratic portfolio exhibits a negative CAR following the 
election. This last result is significant though only in the value-weighted average, which suggests that the 
effect of political connections is more pronounced for the larger companies in the sample.   
The second main result is that a company experiences a positive and statistically significant 
abnormal stock return following the announcement of a board nomination of a politically connected 
individual. In particular, this announcement effect is stronger for a value-weighted than for an equally-
weighted average. In addition, the positive announcement effect holds true both for Republican and 
Democratic connected directors. 
In sum, these results indicate the following two points: First, a company’s value goes up in 
anticipation of future benefits following the nomination of politically connected individuals. Second, 
when the connected board member’s political party gains control of the presidency, the value generated 
by her increases while the value generated by a director connected to the opposing party decreases.  
These findings also suggest a new way in which boards can increase firm value. While past 
studies have argued that the board can add value either by monitoring or by advising management (see for 
example, Adams and Ferreira, 2007), this paper shows that the board can also add value via the 
connections it provides with politicians.  
The results in the paper are robust to a number of different specifications. For example, the 
election results remain strongly significant for different choices of event windows surrounding the 2000 
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elections, and in the cross-section after controlling for several company characteristics such as size, past 
returns (momentum) and book to market ratio.  
The paper also specifically addresses a number of different interpretations for the results at hand 
and controls for them. First, it might be argued that the post-election abnormal returns are not due to the 
fact that companies are politically connected but rather that these abnormal returns simply mirror the 
political preferences of the company’s industry. As an example, Republican boards may serve in 
companies in a particular industry that stands to benefit from a win of the Republican Party due to its 
specific political platform and regardless of whether or not the company itself is politically connected.  
To deal with this issue, the analysis is repeated by calculating abnormal returns using industry-
adjusted returns. The results remain significant, indicating that companies with politically connected 
boards outperform their industry in the post-election period. This suggests that political board members 
represent connections rather than preferences of the industry. To further illustrate this point, the paper 
employs a second (less direct) measure of connections based on information regarding all money 
donations made by companies to the two political parties prior to the 2000 election.4  Using this measure, 
the paper finds that, unlike politically connected board members, political donations seem to represent the 
political preferences of the industry rather than political connections. Namely, controlling for both 
donations and political board affiliations, the results indicate that companies that donate more to 
Republicans (Democrats) do not outperform (underperform) their industry in the post-election period, but 
companies with a Republican (Democratic) board do.   
Further industry analysis shows that companies with politically connected boards are relatively 
evenly distributed across the Fama-French industry groups. It is also worth noting that the industry 
                                                 
4
 This second data set comes from the Center of Responsive Politics (CRP), which collects information provided by the Federal 
Election Commission. 
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distribution of Republican companies is statistically not different from the industry distribution of 
Democratic companies. This further suggests that the results are not driven by any specific industry.5   
A second interpretation of the results deals with the announcement returns following the board 
nominations of politically connected directors. One question that arises is whether the same abnormal 
returns are observed when non-political directors are added to the board of the same company. It might be 
argued that the observed effect is due to the characteristics of the company itself or to the fact that these 
directors are independent rather than politically connected. To address this issue, each announcement of 
the board nomination of a former politician is matched with an announcement by the same company of 
another nomination of an independent director who is not politically connected. The results suggest that 
independent non-political directors do not generate a positive abnormal return. These results are 
consistent with Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) who also show that the 
announcement effect of the nomination of independent directors is either insignificantly different from 
zero or negative. While Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) do find a very small positive announcement effect 
of the order of 0.2%, this effect is much smaller than the effect found here. Furthermore, they find the 
effect to be significant only for small firms. This is the opposite of the findings in our paper, which 
suggests that the announcement effects here are due to the unique political characteristics of the sample of 
directors. 
A final interpretation of the positive announcement returns following the board nomination could 
be that these abnormal returns are not due to the board members being politically connected but rather to 
their superb quality and expertise. The paper controls for this possibility by sorting politically connected 
board members into two groups; those individuals that had a political position that was functionally 
related to the company for which they receive their board nomination and those individuals whose 
political position was unrelated. If expertise was indeed the only driving force behind the positive 
announcement returns, then positive announcement returns should only be observed for board members 
                                                 
5
 The industry analysis in the paper is done using the Fama-French 30 industry classification. The results remain the same when 
using alternative Fama-French industry specifications as well as when specifically controlling for the oil industry, the defense 
industry, and utilities.    
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with related experience. The results in the paper show that the announcement return of related board 
members is indeed higher than that for not related board members, but that the announcement returns for 
the latter group are consistently positive and significant. 
In fact, after sorting the sample of former politicians into numerous sub-groups we find that there 
is no sub-classification that can solely explain the positive announcement returns. Rather, it seems that 
any type of political connection initiated at any point in time results in a positive announcement return. 
This suggests that there are many different ways in which political connections may help companies. Note, 
however, that we do not argue that all companies can benefit from political connections as it is likely that 
our sample of  companies that have been able to attract former politicians are probably also more likely to 
benefit from these political connections. Nevertheless, this is consistent with our argument that 
connections add value.  
The value from political connections may arise in many different ways. There are both direct 
channels as well as more subtle indirect channels. For example, government officials can influence the 
allocation of lucrative government contracts towards the connected company. As another example, 
legislators can impose tariffs on competitors (especially foreign companies) to the benefit of specific 
companies. In addition, they can use tax incentives to promote the prospects of one product/business area 
and discourage those of others. Furthermore, the government can change various regulatory requirements 
that may also have a substantial effect on value. Finally, government officials with ties outside the U.S. 
can be beneficial in opening doors abroad. Thus, former politicians with various backgrounds, either in 
the administration or in the legislative branch or in any other type of political position, can be valuable to 
a company.    
This study relates to two main strands of the literature: the first studies the relation between 
politics and business and the second studies how board attributes and director characteristics affect the 
company. 
The literature on the importance of political connections and on its value implications is relatively 
small. Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), and Faccio and Parsley (2007) all document the impact of political 
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links on firm value in countries with weak legal systems. Fisman (2001) looks at companies in Indonesia 
that are connected to the Suharto family and shows that these companies lose value following several 
announcements regarding the deteriorating health of President Suharto.6 Faccio (2006) studies political 
connections across many countries and documents that most politically connected companies are listed in 
countries with high levels of corruption and a weak legal system. She further shows that the value of these 
companies increases when their executives enter politics. However, she finds that this latter result comes 
from the sub-sample of companies in countries with high levels of corruption.7 Faccio and Parsley (2007) 
shows that companies located in a politician’s home town decrease in value upon the announcement of 
the politician’s unexpected death.  Finally, Faccio et al. (2006) show one direct way in which connections 
create value by demonstrating that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out by the 
government.   
Several studies provide limited evidence that is suggestive of the existence of political biases in 
the U.S. For example, Roberts (1990) shows that following the death of the ranking Democrat on the 
Senate Armed Service Committee the value of firms located in the Senator’s state decreased in value. 
However, he shows that this is true both for firms that made donations to the Senator as well as those that 
did not. Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) show that interest-group political action committees (PACs) 
donate more to a politician who is a member of a House Committee that is of relevance to them, but that 
rival PACs do not. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) show that companies in industries with larger 
government dealings tend to have a larger number of political directors. Thus, their paper does not have 
any direct implications on whether these connections create value. Finally, in a recent study that looks at 
usury laws in the 19th century across different states in the U.S., Benmelech and Moskowitz (2007) find 
evidence that usury laws were used by incumbents with political power to limit their competitors’ ability 
to enter the market.  
                                                 
6
 Fisman et al. (2006) use a similar methodology to identify changes in Vice-President Cheney’s health condition and test for 
their value impact.  
 
7
 Note that Faccio’s initial sample does include companies from countries with low levels of corruption such as the UK and the 
U.S., but she finds no value impact for those companies.  
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As mentioned above, this paper promotes the idea that political connections create value by 
generating future benefits to the firm.  Three recent papers that use donation data stop short of making 
this point.  These papers include Jayachandran (2006), Knight (2006), and Shon (2006). Jayachandran 
(2006) looks at the 2001 departure of Senator Jim Jeffords from the Republican to the Democratic Party.  
She shows that this event results in a decrease in value of firms donating to the Republicans. However, as 
she argues in the paper “An important open question that the results do not fully resolve is whether the 
relationship is casual, that is, whether firms contribute to politicians whose intrinsic views match the 
firms’ interests or whether donations affect politicians’ behavior” (p. 2 ).    
Knight (2006) analyzes the stock return around the 2000 Presidential Election of a sample of 
firms that are identified by financial analysts as likely to fare well under Bush and Gore administrations. 
His objective is to show that policy platforms are capitalized into equity prices. While Knight (2006) also 
uses these firms’ donation data as a robustness check for the categorization made by the financial analysts, 
the thrust of his work is that firms in industries that stand to benefit from the Bush administration will 
donate more to the Bush Campaign. Thus, again, his results cannot be used to show that connections 
bring about or cause future financial benefits.  Similarly, Shon (2006) looks only at donations at an 
industry level and shows that firms in industries that donate more to Republicans exhibit a positive stock 
price return following Bush’s win in the 2000 election.8   
To summarize, all three of these papers are close to our paper in that they show that there exists a 
positive relation between donations to one of the two Parties and a positive stock return following an 
increase in power of that Party.  However, to our knowledge, our paper is the first to use a direct measure 
of the political connections of the board of directors to show that political connections in the U.S. are 
viewed by the market as creating value.   
                                                 
8
 Looking at campaign contributions in Brazil, Claessens et al. (2006) find that donating companies experience higher stock 
returns around elections. Using a different cut of donation data, Cooper et al. (2007) consider the long-run performance of 
donating companies in the U.S. 
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More specifically, unlike political contributions, which are likely to affect election outcomes and 
hence may represent a company’s political preferences rather than its political influence, it is more 
difficult to argue that a company nominates a former politician to its board (on average these directors are 
nominated more than five years before the 2000 election) in order to increase the chance that that 
politician’s party will win the elections. It is also more difficult to argue that the positive stock price 
response to the announcement of the nomination itself is a signal that the government is planning to start 
implementing policies that are favorable to the company. 9 Thus, again, the unique contribution of this 
paper is in showing that the impact of political connections on value is more likely to be due to the 
market’s belief that these connections provide companies with political influence.  
The second strand of the literature related to this study includes papers that explore whether or 
not the board of directors can add value to the company (see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a recent 
survey of this literature). Even more closely related to this paper is the growing body of work that looks at 
director characteristics. For example, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) and Guner et al. (2006) focus on 
boards with directors that have banking experience. Ferris et al. (2003), Perry and Peyer (2005), and Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006) all analyze different implications of having directors with multiple board seats.  
Finally, Adams and Ferreira (2004) analyze boards that have female directors.  In the context of these 
papers, this study focuses on directors with the unique characteristic of having a political background.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data used in this 
paper. Section 3 presents the empirical analyses and the main results of the paper. Finally, Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Data description 
The analyses in this paper utilize two types of data. The first data set consists of original data 
containing information regarding the political affiliation of each board member of all companies in the 
                                                 
9
 Note, that we do not argue that board nominations of a politician are exogenous and that they are completely unanticipated by 
the market. Rather, we believe that the announcement simply reflects the resolution of whatever remaining uncertainty exists 
with respect to whether the former politician will join this board and not that of another company.    
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S&P500. The second data set consists of information on donations made by publicly traded companies to 
the Republican and Democratic Parties. Both data sets are described in more detail below. In addition to 
these data, the paper uses CRSP and Compustat data for the sample companies as well as CRSP data for 
the market indexes and Fama-French industry return data.  
 
2.1. Board data 
Board connections are derived by considering the composition of the board of directors of all 
S&P500 companies in the years 1996 and 2000 and analyzing the background of each board member. 
Section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Act requires companies to file definite 
proxy statements (submission type Def 14a), containing information about their board members. These 
filings, which are hand-collected from the EDGAR database of the SEC, contain a brief description of 
each board member’s career background. Based on these data, it is possible to identify whether board 
members are connected to the Republicans, to the Democrats, or to neither. A board member is defined as 
being politically connected if she at any time in her past held a position such as Senator, Member of the 
House of Representatives, Member of the Administration, or has been a Director of an organization such 
as the CIA. A full list of these positions is provided in Table 1.  
Politically connected board members are further sorted into two sub-groups based on whether 
their former political position is related to the industry sector of the company for which they become a 
board member. A former politician is classified as being related if she is nominated to a company that 
operates in an industry that is related to her past political duties. More specifically, a board member is 
classified as being related if she served in a committee, department, or government agency that deals with 
the industry in which the nominating company operates. For example, a senator who served on the Energy 
and Natural Resources Committee and joins the board of an oil company is classified as being related.  
We use the sample of directors serving on the boards of S&P500 firms in November 2000 to 
analyze the stock price response of connected companies to the announcement of the results of the 
Presidential Election. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample of these politically connected 
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boards. According to the definition used in this paper, 153 of the S&P500 companies are politically 
connected at the time of the 2000 election. Out of these 153 companies, 78 companies have at least one 
board member connected to the Republicans, but no board member connected to the Democrats, while 47 
companies have at least one board member connected to the Democrats, but no board member connected 
to the Republicans. The remaining connected companies have at least one board member connected to the 
Republicans and at least one board member connected to the Democrats. The vast majority of politically 
connected board members serve as independent directors, while only four politically connected board 
members have an internal appointment, mainly as CEO. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that, on 
average, connected companies tend to be larger than non-connected companies. The Table also 
documents that, at the time of the 2000 election, politically connected board members have served an 
average of 5.5 years on their boards. The board member with the longest tenure was nominated in 1981, 
while the board member with the shortest tenure was nominated in the election year 2000.  
Note, that our sample of connected companies is relatively evenly distributed across different 
industries. However, consistent with the findings of Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) we find a higher 
number of connected companies (both republican and democrats) in regulated industries. For example, 
the highest share of politically connected companies and directors can be found in the Banking and 
Utilities industries.  
When analyzing the announcement effect of the nomination of politically connected directors, we 
start with a sample of 254 connected board members in S&P500 companies in 1996 and 2000. For this set 
of directors, we perform a Lexis-Nexis press search to obtain the announcement date of a nomination of 
these directors to any publicly traded company. This procedure provides a total of 592 nominations, 
which occur in the time period between 1981 and 2005. A number of 243 nominations are eliminated as 
the announcement of the nomination coincides with other price-relevant events such as a dividend or an 
earnings announcement, a share repurchase, or an M&A activity. The final sample of 349 nominations is 
then analyzed. In this sample, directors serve on average on 4.46 boards (not necessarily at the same time). 
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The maximum number of positions for one board member in the sample amounts to 13.10 Nominations are 
only considered if the board member already has a political career at the time of the announcement of the 
nomination. This restriction rules out the case of board members who are not yet politically connected at 
the time they are nominated.  
 
2.2. Donation data 
Donation data are provided by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). The CRP is a non-
partisan, non-profit research organization supported by a combination of foundation grants and individual 
contributions.  It collects information on companies’ donations to the Democratic and Republican Parties. 
The underlying information comes from the Federal Election Commission, which publicly discloses funds 
raised and spent. The Federal Election Campaign Act requires candidate committees, party committees 
and political action committees (PACs) to file periodic reports, disclosing the amount and source of 
money raised and spent. For each election cycle, candidates must identify all party committees and PACs 
that contribute to their campaigns, all individuals who donate more than $200, and all expenditures 
exceeding $200.  
The CRP classifies 80 donating industries, from agricultural services to waste management. 
Among these industries are labor unions and various groups that do not fall into a genuine business, 
including retired individuals and government employees. Donation amounts in each industry are the sum 
of contributions to federal candidates of $200 or more from individuals and PACs, and contributions to 
political parties from PACs, soft money and individual donors.  
For each election cycle, the CRP provides information on the 20 largest contributors in each of 
the 80 industries. The sample in this paper is constructed by using this information for the 1999 and 2000 
election cycle. A company is included in the sample if it belongs to the 20 largest contributors in the 80 
industries classified by the CRP, if it is publicly listed, and if the total donation exceeds $100,000. This 
                                                 
10
 Ann McLaughlin, Secretary of Labor between 1987 and 1989, and Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense between 1987 and 
1989, have served on a total of 13 boards between the years 1989 and 2005. 
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results in a total of 315 sample companies. Table 2 provides an overview of the amounts of money that 
these companies donate to the Republican and the Democratic Parties. The total donations amount to 
$246 million, with $88 million going to the Democrats and $158 million going to the Republicans. This 
compares to total donations of $1,634 million recorded by the CRP. The donation share to the 
Republicans is higher in the sample than in the overall population, as the largest contributors to the 
Democrats are not publicly listed organizations (e.g. labor unions). Most of the sample companies donate 
to both parties, but the relative shares vary substantially. Only 18 of the 315 sample companies donate to 
only one of the two major parties. The sample companies donate on average $779,985. The maximum 
donation made by one of the sample companies is $5,075,311, while the minimum amounts to $100,443. 
 
3. Empirical results 
The empirical analysis consists of three parts. The first part provides univariate results on the 
impact of politically connected board members (and corporate donations) on companies’ post-election 
stock returns. The second part tests for the multivariate cross-sectional impact on stock returns after 
controlling for a number of other potentially relevant factors. While the previous two analyses focus on 
the stock returns after the Election Day, the third analysis concentrates on the announcement of the 
nomination to the board of politically connected board members.  
 
3.1. Univariate results 
The first part of the empirical analysis tests for the stock price reactions of politically connected 
companies to the 2000 Presidential Election in a univariate setup. The first piece of this analysis focuses 
on the original measure of politically connected board members, while the second piece of this analysis 
considers corporate donations. 
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3.1.1. Board connection results 
Political connections are defined based on the political background of the board members in each 
S&P 500 company in the year 2000. Board members with the previously described former political 
positions may help a company build and maintain close links to the administration. The hypothesis is that 
if connections matter, then board members linked to Republicans should be more valuable than board 
members linked to Democrats, when the Republicans win the election.  
Table 3 analyzes the relation between stock returns following the Election Day and several 
definitions of political connections of board members for all S&P500 companies. The first analysis 
considers only those companies in which there is at least one board member with a connection to one 
party and no board member with a connection to the other party. These are defined as pure connections. 
In 78 companies, board members have connections only to the Republicans, while in 47 companies board 
members have connections only to the Democrats. The results in Panel a) of Table 3 show that the 
market-adjusted post-election returns for companies with connections to the Republicans are positive and 
significant. This holds for both the equally-weighted and the value-weighted average. The market-
adjusted post-election stock returns for companies with connections to the Democrats are insignificant in 
the equally-weighted average, but significantly negative in the value-weighted average. This suggests that 
mainly large companies with connections to the Democrats decrease in value following the election. The 
difference in returns between companies with connections to the Democrats and Republicans is 
statistically significant for all event windows and for all specifications, in both the equally-weighted and 
the value-weighted averages.11 
The subsequent analysis focuses on those companies that are connected to the Republicans and 
considers the specific political positions that the connected board members held before being nominated 
to the companies’ boards. In the second classification, the sample of Republican companies is thus 
                                                 
11
 The results for the 28 companies in which there is at least one board member with an affiliation to the Republicans and at least 
one board member with an affiliation to the Democrats are inconclusive in the equally-weighted and the value-weighted 
averages. A more thorough analysis of this sample of mixed companies would require considering different sub-groups based 
on the relative importance of the Republican versus Democratic board members. However, the number of observations for 
these sub-samples is too small for a meaningful analysis. 
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divided based on whether at least one of its board member’s former political positions is related to the 
industry sector of the company. The goal is to test whether, in addition to the pure existence of a political 
connection, the expertise and knowledge that the board member gained through her political position have 
an impact. Recall that a board member is defined as being related if she is nominated to a company that 
operates in the same functional area in which she served in her political career. Among the sample 
companies, 34 Republican companies have at least one related board member and 44 companies have no 
related board member. 
Panel b) of Table 3 reports the results for this classification. The market-adjusted returns for both 
related and not related companies with connections to the Republicans are positive and significant in each 
event window and in both the equally-weighted and value-weighted average. This suggests that the pure 
existence of a political connection, regardless of the specific nature of that connection, creates value for 
the company. At the same time, the difference in returns between related and not related Republican 
companies is positive for each event window and significant for some event windows, which suggests 
that the specific expertise that a politically connected board member gained through her political position 
generates additional value.   
As a third classification of board connections, companies are sorted based on the political 
position that a board member held before being nominated to the board. Panel c) of Table 3 shows that 
there are 44 companies in which at least one board member was a senator, a member of the House, or a 
member of the administration; while there are 23 companies in which politically connected board 
members held positions other than the ones stated above. The results are again significant for both groups 
in each event window and in both the equally-weighted and value-weighted average, while the difference 
in returns between the two groups fails to be significant. The results suggest that the specific political 
position that a board member held is not important beyond the pure existence of a political position. 
In conclusion, the results in this analysis suggest that companies benefit substantially from 
connections to the election-winning party. Their abnormal stock returns are positive and statistically 
significant and they are statistically significantly higher than the returns for companies with links to the 
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losing party. Furthermore, political connections generate value independent of the specific nature of those 
connections, while specific expertise generates additional value.12 
 
3.1.2. Donation results 
As mentioned before, the majority of the sample companies donate to both parties, which implies 
that hedging considerations are one important determinant of their donations. Nevertheless, the cross-
sectional variation in the relative donations made to the two parties provides an opportunity to categorize 
companies as benefiting more from one party or another.  
We repeat the analysis in Table 3 using donation amounts in order to classify companies into 
Republican and Democratic and find results similar to those in Table 3. Since our focus is on political 
connections of the board, we do not provide the details of this analysis in this paper. They are available 
upon request. Furthermore, as will be shown in the multivariate analysis, we argue that donations seem to 
represent industry-wide preferences rather than company-level connections. 
 
3.2. Cross-sectional results 
The previous analysis compares the post-election stock returns for different portfolios of 
companies and provides evidence for the impact of board connections on company value by showing that 
companies that are connected to the Republicans experience positive and significantly higher returns than 
companies that are connected to the Democrats. It is important to test this relation in the cross-section and 
to control for other firm characteristics.  
In the multivariate tests, the dependent variable is the post-election CAR for days (+1,+3) for 
each S&P 500 company. Each company’s return is adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted market index. 
The control variables comprise several firm characteristics: the log of each company’s market 
                                                 
12
 As an additional event, we repeat the analysis in Jayachandran (2006) that considers the decision by Senator Jim Jeffords to 
leave the Republican Part in May 2001. This event resulted in a change in power in the U.S. Senate. Using the political 
classification of the board of directors for our sample companies, we find results that exactly mirror Jayachandran’s results. In 
particular, we find that Republican companies experience a negative and significant decline in their stock price in the period 
between May 18, 2001, and May 25, 2001. We also find, as she does, that in the same period of time the stock returns for 
Democratic companies are not significantly different from zero. These results are available upon request. 
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capitalization, its book-to-market ratio, and a momentum variable, which is the company’s market-
adjusted return in the 3rd quarter of 2000. The variables of interest are different categorical and dummy 
variables that indicate whether a company is connected or donates to either of the two parties.13 The 
results are reported in Table 4. 
Model 1 tests for the impact of companies’ board connections. This is measured by the variable 
Board Rep-Dem, which takes a value of one if a company’s board is politically connected only to the 
Republicans, a value of minus one if a company’s board is politically connected only to the Democrats 
and a value of zero otherwise. The results show that the coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. This implies that the political connection of a company’s board remains a significant determinant of 
its post-election stock return even after controlling for other firm characteristics. The same holds true for 
the variable Donations Rep-Dem in Model 2, which is constructed analogously to Board Rep-Dem based 
on the donation data. Model 3 includes both Board Rep-Dem and Donations Rep-Dem, and both variables 
are again positive and significant at the 1% level.  
Starting with Model 4, the estimations consider this relation in more depth by analyzing whether 
it is driven by either or both of the two parties. For this purpose, four more dummy variables and one 
interaction variable are introduced. The first of these variables takes a value of one if a company is 
politically connected only to the Republicans and a value of zero otherwise, whereas the second variable 
takes a value of one if a company is politically connected only to the Democrats and a value of zero 
otherwise. In analogy for the donation part, the third dummy variable takes a value of one if a company 
donates more to the Republicans than to the Democrats and a value of zero otherwise, whereas the fourth 
variable takes a value of one if a company donates more to the Democrats than to the Republicans and a 
value of zero otherwise. Motivated by the findings in Faccio and Parsley (2007), who show the impact of 
the geographic proximity of company headquarters to a politician’s home town, this paper constructs an 
additional dummy variable that takes a value of one if the Republicans win the majority of the 
                                                 
13
 The correlation between board connections to a party and its donations to that party is positive with a coefficient of 0.07, but 
fails to be significant. This implies that connections of board members and donations do not necessarily go hand in hand. 
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presidential votes in the state in which a company is headquartered and a value of zero otherwise. This 
variable is interacted with the Republican board dummy variable to test whether there is an effect for 
companies that are connected to the Republicans and located in a Republican state.  
The results in Models 4 to 10 show that all but one of the dummy variables are significant at least 
at the 5% level. While companies with board connections to the Republicans experience a significantly 
positive abnormal post-election return (Model 4), companies with board connections to the Democrats 
suffer a significant drop in value (Model 6). These returns are also economically significant. Companies 
with board connections to the Republicans experience nearly a 3% increase in value, while companies 
with board connections to the Democrats experience nearly a 3% drop in value. Model 5 shows that there 
is no additional effect for companies with Republican board connections from having their headquarters 
in a Republican state. The coefficient for the interaction variable is positive, but fails to be significant. 
The insights from Models 4 and 6 still hold when both variables are included simultaneously (Model 7) 
and when the two donation dummy variables are included in Models 8 to 10. The results for the two 
donation dummy variables show that the coefficient for donations to the Republicans is positive and 
significant, while the coefficient for donations to Democrats is negative, but not significant. This might be 
due to the fewer number of companies donating more to the Democrats than to the Republicans and in 
particular the even fewer number of those companies with a clear donation tendency to the Democrats.  
The results so far suggest that political connections affect company value in the post-election 
period. An alternative explanation for this evidence could be motivated by the findings in Knight (2006) 
who points out that each party follows certain policies that will have differing effects on the outlook of 
certain industries. As two examples, a reform of the health care system may benefit or hurt the 
pharmaceutical industry, while a specific foreign policy may benefit or hurt the defense industry. Thus, a 
company may be affected by these general policies merely due to the fact that it is in a specific industry 
and not due to its political connections. To address this issue, the next specification controls for the return 
in the industry in which the company operates. 
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Table 5 reports the results for the case in which the return for each company in the S&P500 index 
is adjusted by the equally-weighted return of its industry. The industry classification of each company is 
defined by the Fama-French 30 industries.14 The explanatory variables are identical to those in Table 4. 
The results in Table 5 show that all the board connection variables of interest that are significant with 
market-adjusted returns are still significant with industry-adjusted returns. In particular, neither the 
categorical variables in Models 1 to 3 lose their significance nor do the dummy variables for board 
connections in Models 4, 6, and 7. In fact, the coefficients for the variables that characterize a company’s 
board connections are significant again at least at the 5% level. In contrast, the dummy variables for 
donations in Models 9 and 10 become insignificant under this specification. This suggests that while the 
donation variable may likely represent an (endogenous) industry effect, our measure of political 
connections based on the board data does not. Namely, our measure of connections remains significant 
even after controlling for these industry effects.  
In total, the results in Tables 4 and 5 provide evidence that the political connections of companies’ 
board members have a significant impact on their post-election stock returns. This result holds even after 
controlling for other important firm characteristics and in particular the industry reaction to the election 
outcome. 
 
3.3. Nomination of politically connected board members 
An additional approach to test for the impact of politically connected board members is to 
analyze the abnormal returns following the announcements of their nominations. The underlying 
economic model is one in which there is a limited supply of individuals with political connections that are 
both willing and able to use their political connections for the purpose of helping the company. Therefore, 
there is uncertainty in the market about which of the competing companies that value these connections 
will be able to obtain this scarce resource. While the announcement by a company that it was able to 
                                                 
14
 As mentioned in footnote 5, the analysis is repeated for alternative Fama-French industry specifications with no material 
impact on the results. 
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attract a politically connected individual might be somewhat anticipated by the market, the actual 
announcement return reflects the resolution of any remaining uncertainty that had existed with respect to 
which of the group of competing companies was actually able to get hold of this valuable resource of 
limited supply.15  
Our primary objective then is to test whether political connections are valuable by analyzing the 
announcement return surrounding the nominations. Furthermore, it is possible to use the announcement 
returns to analyze the secondary question whether some connections are more valuable than others. The 
magnitude of the announcement return can be used as a measure of the importance of the new connection. 
For example, one can ask whether connections to the legislator or the administration are more important 
than other connections, whether a politician’s connections weaken over time, or whether connections to 
the administration (legislator) matter more during a time when the former politician’s party is in control 
of the administration (legislator). 
For some of these secondary questions it is important to obtain more details about what drives the 
timing of nominations. Namely, are they mostly driven by supply (i.e., politicians join boards once they 
leave their political position) or are they mostly driven by demand (i.e., politicians are added to the board 
at a time when they are most valuable to the corporation)?   
Table 6 provides descriptive statistics of the time-trend in nominations over the presidential and 
legislative cycles. In particular, it considers when and under which majorities nominations occur.  The 
table illustrates several points. First, it shows that nominations are not evenly distributed over the four-
year political cycle, but rather that most of them occur in a year following a presidential or a midterm 
election. More than a third of the observations occur in the first year of a presidential cycle and more than 
63% of the nominations occur in the year following a presidential or midterm election. Thus companies 
tend to hire political directors at the beginning of either a presidential or a congressional cycle.16 While 
                                                 
15
 It is important to note that institutional constraints on the financial compensation of corporate boards prevent politically 
connected board members from capturing the entire surplus of their appointments, thereby increasing the value of the 
nominating company.  
 
16
 We thank the referee for bringing this point to our attention.  
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not reported in the table, directors nominated in the first year of a presidential cycle tend to have been out 
of their political office for a much shorter time relative to all others. 
Second, Table 6 shows that nominations of Republican (Democratic) board members are equally 
likely to occur under Republican and Democratic Presidents, but are much more likely to occur in times 
of Democratic (Republican) control of house and senate. For example, under Republican senate majority 
118 out of 202 nominations are of Republican board members, representing 58% of the total. However, 
under Democratic senate majority 115 out of 147 nominations are of Republican board members, 
representing 78% of the total. Thus, a higher percent of Republicans are nominated during a period of 
Democratic majority. 
The numbers above suggest that nominations are driven more by supply than by demand. 
Demand-driven nominations would imply more Republican (Democratic) nominations under Republican 
(Democratic) regimes, while supply-driven nominations would potentially imply the opposite because the 
supply of former Republicans (Democrats) is higher when Democrats (Republicans) win the majority.17 
To summarize, our main hypothesis is that having a politically connected board member is 
valuable to a company and, hence, we expect that the company’s stock price should increase when the 
nomination of this board member is announced. As for our secondary group of tests, they are aimed at 
determining whether or not some connections are more valuable than others. Alternatively, given that 
these politicians serve on the boards for long stretches of time, it may be the case that all connections are 
valuable as there are many ways in which a former politician can help a company.  
The analysis in Table 7 focuses on the sample of connected board members found in S&P 500 
companies in the years 1996 and 2000. As described before, these board members are nominated for a 
total of 349 positions in companies for which stock market data are available and for which the 
nominations do not coincide with other price-relevant announcements. The first row of Table 7 shows that 
                                                 
17
 As a further illustration of this point, we see that in each of the sample years that follow a year in which the presidential power 
changes, i.e. 1981, 1993, and 2001, the overwhelming majority of nominated board members come from the losing party. In 
1981, the year following the Republican win of the Presidential Election, 6 out of 7 nominees are affiliated with the Democrats. 
In 1993, the sample year with the highest number of board nominations, 33 of the 37 total nominations are of Republicans. This 
year follows the Republican loss of the presidency (congress and house remain Democratic). Finally, in 2001, after the 
Republican win in the Presidential Election, 12 out of 17 nominations are of Democrats. 
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the announcement effect of the nomination of politically connected board members is positive and 
statistically significant in the equally-weighted and in the value-weighted averages. The two-day 
abnormal announcement return amounts to 0.69% in the equally-weighted and to 1.20% in the value-
weighted average. Furthermore, as the first sub-classification in Panel a) of Table 7 shows, returns are 
significantly positive for board members with connections to either the Republican or the Democratic 
Party in both the equally-weighted and value-weighted average. Thus, the value impact is not unique to a 
connection to either of the two parties. 
These results are particularly noteworthy as the previous literature has shown that announcements 
of the nomination of independent board members are associated with returns that are indistinguishable 
from zero. While the significantly positive returns for our sample of independent board members who are 
connected to either of the two parties are indicative of the value of political connections, it is important to 
consider additional explanations for the results at hand. To see whether some political connections matter 
more than others, nominations are further categorized into several sub-groups. As will be seen below, the 
overall results from these sub-classifications indicate that all political connections seem to matter 
regardless of the circumstances under which they are achieved.  
As the second sub-classification, we form two groups based on a nominee’s specific former 
political career.  Consistent with the classification in Table 3, a politically connected board member is 
classified into the first group if she was a senator, a member of the house, or a member of the 
administration; otherwise she is classified into the second group. The results in Panel b) of Table 7 
suggest that there is no statistical difference between the announcement returns of the two groups in the 
equal weighted average but a statistically significant difference in the value weighted average. This 
suggests the possibility that former Senators and Congressmen add more value to the larger companies 
relative to others. Third, announcements are separated based on whether they refer to a director’s 1st and 
2nd or subsequent nominations. The question is whether politically connected board members are 
particularly valuable for the first companies whose board they join as they are less likely to have worn out 
their welcome in the political circles at that point. While the announcement returns are positive and 
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significant for both groups, the magnitude of the impact for the 1st and 2nd nomination is much greater 
than that for subsequent nominations in the value-weighted average.  This again suggests that, for the 
larger companies, the director has a greater impact in the early nominations, and this impact may decrease 
as the director joins more companies.  
Fourth, the nominations of former politicians with positions within the administration are divided 
based on whether or not a director’s political party holds the control of the presidency at the time of the 
announcement. The idea is that a former politician who worked for a previous administration is more 
likely to be connected to the current administration given that it is of the same party. The results for this 
sub-classification are shown in Panel d) of the table. They indicate that former administration politicians 
are indeed more valuable when the current administration is from the same party.  
As a flip side to this last test, nominations are sorted by whether a director is nominated at a time 
in which his or her party holds the majority in either the senate or the house. While the results are positive 
for each sub-group, they tend to be higher for nominations that occur when the other party holds the 
majority. This result would be surprising if presidency and the legislator majority were both held by the 
same party. However, note that during the sample period between 1981 and 2005, there are only five 
years in which the ruling presidential party also holds the majority of the house and senate. The results 
here are therefore necessarily highly negatively correlated with the results presented in Panel d) and are 
thus hard to interpret.  
Finally, motivated by Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) we divide the sample into nominating 
companies in regulated and non-regulated companies. We find that the announcement returns tend to be 
higher in regulated relative to non-regulated industries, but the difference fails to be significant. We 
obtain a similar result when classifying companies based on total government shipments within the 
industry, again according to the measure used by Agrawal and Knoeber (2001).  
One alternative explanation for our results is that the observed positive stock price reactions 
might not only be due to the fact that a board member is politically connected, but also to her expertise. 
As an example, a senator who serves in the Finance committee during her political tenure may learn about 
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general trends including risks and challenges in the finance industry, and this knowledge might be of 
highest importance to companies that operate in banking or insurance. The positive announcement effect 
in this case would thus be partly due to her expertise as well as to her being politically connected. While it 
might be hard to differentiate between expertise in a specific field and general political connection in each 
given case, it is still possible to distinguish between related and not related politically connected board 
members. Thus, in the last classification, Panel h) of Table 7 reports the results for the announcement 
returns for both groups of board members. The results suggest that the nomination of both related 
(defined as a political director who served in a committee, department, or government agency that deals 
with the industry in which the nominating company operates) and not related board members generates 
positive and significant abnormal returns. At the same time, the abnormal returns for related board 
members are higher than those for not related board members. This result suggests that expertise and 
knowledge are valuable, but that the pure existence of political connections independent of their content 
also generates abnormal positive returns.  
As a final robustness check for these results one still needs to show that other independent 
directors nominated to the same companies do not generate a similar abnormal return. For this purpose, 
we compare the announcement returns of the nomination of politically connected board members to those 
of nominations of other board members in the same company at a similar point in time. The matching 
sample is constructed in the following way. For each announcement in a company in the original sample, 
we chose the closest possible announcement of the nomination of another board member in the same 
company who is not politically connected. Those announcements are identified by a search in LexisNexis. 
To ensure time consistency, the matching announcement has to occur in a maximum interval of [-3, 3] 
years around the day of the announcement in the original sample. This procedure yields 319 
announcements in the matching sample.  
The results in Panel a) of Table 8 show that the announcements in the matched sample do not 
result in positive stock returns. While they are not statistically different from zero in the equally-weighted 
average, they are even negative and significant in the value-weighted average. The lack of a positive price 
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reaction in the matched sample is thus consistent with the results in the previous literature.  Most 
importantly, the returns for the original sample are significantly higher than for the matched sample, and 
this holds for both the equally-weighted and value-weighted average.  
To guarantee the highest level of comparability of the results, in the next step announcements of 
CEOs and internal promotions (e.g. CFOs) are excluded from the matching sample, as these may cause 
different stock price reactions than those for outside board members. This procedure generates a sub-
sample of 287 announcements. The results are reported in Panel b) of Table 8 and show that the 
announcement returns in the matched sample are still not significantly positive, albeit not significantly 
negative any more in the value-weighted average. Again and most importantly, the difference in returns 
between the original and the matched sample is positive and highly significant. Finally, 28 more 
observations are dropped in which multiple board members are announced on the same day. The results, 
shown in Panel c) of Table 8, are qualitatively the same as before.18 
Overall, for all sub-classifications we find a positive abnormal return following the nomination of 
a politically connected board member. In particular, the results suggest that while expertise matters, the 
pure existence of a political connection generates positive and significant abnormal returns. This is 
consistent with the findings for the post-election stock returns and suggests that the results in this paper 
are driven by political connections independent of their specific nature. 
 
3.4. Further tests and robustness 
Apart from the empirical tests discussed above, a number of further analyses and robustness tests 
are performed. These tests are described below. 
 
                                                 
18
 Using the announcements of politically connected directors and the matching sample of non–political directors, we run 
multivariate regressions in which we control for size and the book-to-market ratio as well as for the characteristics described in 
Table 7. The main result from this analysis is that what matters for the abnormal announcement return is whether or not you are 
a politician, rather than any sub-classification of the characteristics of the appointment (i.e. who is nominated, at which point in 
time etc.) 
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3.4.1. Choice of event window 
To test for the robustness of the event window, the analyses are repeated for different events 
around the election. First, the 2000 Presidential Election gave Governor Bush only a disputed and tiny 
lead of votes, ranging from 300 to about 1,800 throughout the period of uncertainty with a final margin of 
537 votes. As a consequence, the election was finally decided only on December 13, 2000 after the 
Federal Court’s decision to halt the manual recount of ballots in Florida and the subsequent concession by 
Vice President Gore. Between the election and the final decision, there are a number of exogenous events 
as for example court decisions that increase or decrease the probability of a Republican win. These 
exogenous events provide a unique laboratory in which the value of political connections can be tested. 
Two events deserve particular attention: First, on December 8, the Florida Supreme Court orders a state-
wide recount of ballots in counties with under-votes, thereby increasing the chances for the Democrats to 
win the election. Second, on December 13, Mr. Gore accepts Mr. Bush as the President in a public speech, 
thereby resolving the uncertainty about the election outcome. The event study for politically connected 
board members in Table 3 is repeated for these two events. While the value-weighted portfolio of 
companies with pure connections to the Democrats provides a one-day positive return of 1.45% on 
December 8, the respective Republican portfolio provides a negative return of -1.26%. In contrast, the 
return for the Republican portfolio on December 13 amounts to 0.32%, while the return for the 
Democratic portfolio amounts to -1.63%. The differences in returns between the Democratic and the 
Republican portfolio on both December 8 and December 13 are statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
general, the correlation between the daily abnormal returns of the Democratic and the Republican 
portfolio in the time period between November 8 and December 20 is highly negative with a coefficient 
of -0.46, which is significant at the 1% level. This provides further evidence for the value impact of 
political connections, independent of the choice of the specific event window. Overall, the uncertainty 
around the 2000 Presidential Election is expected to aggravate any attempt to find evidence for the impact 
of political connections on stock returns. The fact that the results in this paper are substantial and 
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significant despite the existing uncertainty on the final election outcome, stresses even more the 
importance of political connections for firm value. 
Second, the analyses are repeated using November 7 as the start date for the event period. This 
choice is motivated by the fact that even though the first election results were announced only after the 
end of trading on the Election Day, November 7, it is possible that the stock market already incorporates 
information arriving during the Election Day. The results are qualitatively the same as the results for the 
event period starting on November 8. 
 
3.4.2. Industry clustering 
While Table 5 controls for industry effects, it is still important to consider whether there is a 
concentration of politically connected companies in certain industries and in particular a concentration of 
Republican/Democratic companies in certain industries. The analysis of the distribution of the sample 
companies across the Fama-French 30 industries shows that Republican/Democratic companies based on 
board connections are relatively evenly distributed across all of these industries. There are two exceptions 
to this in the Utilities industry, which has 9% of the sample companies, and Banking, Insurance, Real 
Estate and Trading industry, which includes 15% of the sample.19 However, both industries have almost 
the same number of Republican firms as Democratic firms (6 republican and 8 democrats in Utilities and 
10 and 9 in Banking, respectively). More formally, a chi-square test of the difference in the industry 
distribution between Republican and Democratic companies fails to be significant (p-value = 0.40). Thus, 
there appears to be no industry bias or clustering in the distribution of Republican and Democratic 
companies.  
Finally, as mentioned before, the industry analysis is repeated for alternative Fama-French 
industry classifications, yielding the same results. In addition, we control for some specific industries that 
                                                 
19
 This finding is similar to that of Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) who conduct a more elaborate test of the industry distribution of 
political directors. 
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might have larger political biases such as the oil industry, the defense industry, and utilities. Again, the 
results remain unchanged.   
 
3.4.3. Weighing of observations 
The analysis of the announcement returns in Table 7 gives equal weight to each announcement of 
a nomination. This means that an individual with many board nominations will appear more often in the 
data set than an individual with only a few board nominations. To rule out the possibility that the 
announcement returns are driven by those board members with many nominations, the analysis is 
repeated by giving equal weight to each individual. This means that first the average announcement return 
is computed for each individual, and then the average is taken across individuals. The results are positive 
and economically and statistically significant. The average announcement return in this approach amounts 
to 0.78% for the two-day window around the announcement and is significant at the 1% level. Further 
analyses are conducted for the same sub-groups as in Table 7, and the results are qualitatively the same as 
before. This suggests that the significantly positive announcement returns represent a general 
phenomenon across politically connected board members and are not driven by a small number of 
individuals. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper shows that political connections have a pervasive impact on the value of public 
companies even within the confine of the strong legal system in the U.S.  The paper sorts companies into 
those that are connected to the Republican Party and those that are connected to the Democratic Party and 
analyzes the value of these connections by looking at two events: the 2000 Presidential Election and the 
nomination of politically connected directors to the board.  
Using a measure of connections based on hand-collected data of the political background of all 
directors on the boards of S&P500 companies in the year 2000, the paper derives the following two main 
results: First, following the announcement of the Republican win, the return difference between 
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companies classified as having a Republican board and those classified as having a Democratic board is 
positive. Furthermore, the announcement returns are positive for the Republican portfolio and negative 
for the Democratic portfolio. These results remain robust after controlling for several firm characteristics 
as well as for industry effects.   
Second, following the announcement of the board nomination of a politically connected 
individual, there is on average a positive and significant stock price response. This positive announcement 
effect is more pronounced for the larger companies in the sample but holds for Republican directors as 
well as for Democratic directors. It is independent of the specific nature of the political position held. 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this paper regarding the value of political connections 
opens a number of interesting avenues for future research.  In particular, it will be interesting to explore 
the specific actions that create this value and their legal and political ramifications.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter II. Political Connections and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts 
 
1. Introduction 
A growing body of recent research finds that political connections add value to the corporation. 
Studies such as Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001), Faccio (2006), and Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2007) use 
stock market data to demonstrate that the value of politically connected companies is affected by changes 
in the political landscape. However, while these studies point to the value of having political connections, 
they remain silent about the exact source of this value.  
The present study attempts to shed light on this issue by analyzing the allocation of government 
procurement contracts across the largest U.S. publicly traded companies. Government procurement 
contracts total more than 3.1 trillion dollars over the sample period between 1990 and 2004, and thus the 
allocation of these contracts is perhaps the most direct way in which political connections may influence 
company values.20   
The following quote from the Wall Street Journal features an anecdotal story that highlights the 
general question that is analyzed in this study. 
 
“The tale of Bajagua's success in getting the contract involves, among other things, well-timed 
campaign contributions to local members of Congress and other political figures. The firm also enlisted 
people with crucial connections...”                                                                  
               WSJ January 29, 2007. 
 
                                                 
20
 Studies by Khwaja and Mian (2005) and Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) also study how politicians generate firm 
value. These studies, discussed below, look at companies in countries in which there is a high level of corruption and focus on 
the impact of politicians on a company’s loans.   
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If, as suggested by the quote above, connections influence contract awards, then companies that 
are connected to a political party will receive more government contracts during periods in which that 
political party has greater control relative to periods in which that party has less control. In contrast, 
during the same time, companies that are connected to the opposing party will receive fewer contracts.  
To provide a specific example, consider the case of two companies in the S&P500 that receive 
government procurement contracts during the 1990s. The two companies, Phillips Petroleum and 
Occidental Petroleum, are both in the Petroleum and Natural Gas industry (based on the Fama-French 
industry classification). Phillips Petroleum has several former Republicans on its board of directors and 
no former Democrats while Occidental Petroleum has several former Democrats on its board and no 
former Republicans (see Table 9 for a detailed description of these companies and their politically 
connected board members). For example, Phillips Petroleum has on its board James Edwards who was the 
Energy Secretary under President Reagan between 1981 and 1982. Occidental Petroleum has on its board 
Albert Gore who was a Tennessee Senator with the Democratic Party until 1971. For our study, Philips 
Petroleum is defined as a Republican company and Occidental Petroleum as a Democratic company.   
What happens then to the government contracts that these companies receive once there is a 
change in the political landscape? In this example, we focus on the 1994 midterm election in which 
control of the House and Senate changes from the Democratic to the Republican Party. As our analysis 
indicates, both companies experience big changes in their government contracts around this time. Philips 
Petroleum’s government procurement contracts increase from a total of $120 million during the 1990 to 
1993 period to a total of $289.3 million in the period between 1995 and 1998. In contrast, Occidental 
Petroleum experiences a decrease in contracts from $169.5 million during the 1990 to 1993 period to 
$143.7 million in the period between 1995 and 1998. Thus, while both companies operate in the same 
industry and have seemingly similar characteristics, the company with a Republican (Democratic) board 
experiences an increase (decrease) in its government contracts following the 1994 midterm election. This 
anecdotal case study demonstrates what we analyze more rigorously in the remainder of the paper. 
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More generally, the paper focuses on a sample of all companies that are in the S&P500 in the 
years 1994 and 2000. The choice of 1994 and 2000 as the two focal points is based on the fact that there 
is a shift in political control in both the 1994 midterm election and the 2000 presidential election. The 
1994 midterm election results in a shift of control in both the House and the Senate from being majority 
controlled by Democrats to being majority controlled by Republicans. The 2000 presidential election 
results in a shift of control of the presidency from Democratic to Republican. These changes imply that 
the influence over the allocation of procurement contracts is likely to switch from the Democrats to the 
Republicans.21   
For each company, the study first identifies the political party to which the company is connected, 
as measured by the political background of the individuals on the board of directors. 
The study then calculates the change in the value of each company’s procurement contracts 
surrounding the 1994 and the 2000 election. Specifically, companies in the S&P500 in 1994 and in 2000 
are classified into one of the following three categories: (1) Those that are connected to the Republicans, 
(2) those that are connected to the Democrats, and (3) others.22 The classification of political connections 
is based on hand-collected data detailing the past political positions held by each of the board members of 
S&P500 companies in 1994 and 2000. A company is classified as being Republican (Democratic) if it has 
at least one director with a past political position with the Republicans (Democrats) and if the company 
has no other director with any past political position with the Democrats (Republicans).  
Given the above classification, for each company in the 1994 sample (2000 sample) we compare 
the total value of procurement contracts that it receives between 1990 and 1993 (1996 and 1999) with the 
total value of these contracts that it receives between 1995 and 1998 (2001 and 2004). The procurement 
contracts that are considered include all contracts awarded to the company itself and to any of its 
subsidiaries.  
                                                 
21
 See below for a more elaborate discussion of how procurement contracts are awarded. 
 
22
 Others include companies without any political connection and companies with political connections to both parties. 
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The main findings for the 1994 sample are that companies connected to the Republicans are more 
likely to experience an increase in the value of their procurement contracts following the 1994 change in 
the political landscape. The paper also finds that companies connected to the Democrats are more likely 
to experience a decrease in the value of their procurement contracts following the 1994 change. These 
results are both economically and statistically significant and remain significant after controlling for 
several company characteristics such as size, book-to-market ratio, and capital expenditure.  
The results for the 2000 sample are qualitatively the same as for the 1994 sample. In this case, 
again, companies that are connected to the Republicans are more likely to experience an increase in 
contracts while companies that are connected to the Democrats are more likely to experience a decrease in 
contracts following the 2000 presidential election. The only difference in the results here is that the 
decrease in contracts of the Democratic companies is not statistically significant.23 
The paper addresses several interpretations of the results.  First, one might ask whether 
companies that are defined as Republican simply have preferences that are naturally aligned with the 
Republican agenda and, therefore, also receive more contracts when Republicans are in power. This 
argument especially has merit on an industry level as Republicans tend to favor certain industries while 
Democrats tend to favor others (e.g. oil companies likely have a preference for the Republican agenda). 
Thus, it may be the case that Republican boards serve in companies that are in a particular industry that 
stands to benefit from a win of the Republican Party due to its specific political platform and regardless of 
whether or not the company itself is politically connected. To deal with this issue the analysis is repeated 
after controlling directly for an industry effect with industry dummies in general as well as with dummies 
for those specific industries in which there is a larger concentration of politically connected companies. 
The results remain unaffected by these controls. Furthermore, a direct test of the distribution of 
Democratic and Republican companies across the Fama-French 30 industries (see Figure 1 and Table 18) 
                                                 
23
 In the empirical specification Republican companies are compared to all S&P 500 companies and Democrat companies are 
compared to all S&P500 companies. A simpler analysis comparing Republican companies to Democrat companies yields even 
stronger and more pronounced results. 
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suggests that the two distributions are not statistically different from each other. Thus, political board 
members represent connections rather than industry-level preferences.24   
Second, companies that might have agendas that correlate with a given party are likely to donate 
to the political campaign of that party. Thus, we control for political donations and find that donations 
cannot explain contract awards but board affiliations remain significant. This provides further evidence 
that board affiliations represent connections rather than company preferences.  
A third issue related to the above point is whether the results are due to the fact that Republican 
companies are on a different trajectory than Democratic companies. To address this issue the analysis is 
repeated after controlling for each company’s past sales growth (as well as past growth in procurement 
contracts and past growth in company size). Controlling for these trends does not affect any of the results.  
A more general approach that captures any possible unobserved difference in trends between 
Republican and Democrat companies is to conduct a placebo test whereby we use a year in which there is 
no political change, 1997, as the event year. If indeed Republican and Democrat companies are on 
different trajectories and our results do not come from the change in the political landscape then we 
should also find that Republican companies obtain more contracts following 1997 and Democratic 
companies obtain less contract following that year. However, when we repeat our tests around the 1997 
event year we find that the change in contracts to Republican companies and to Democrat companies is 
not statistically different from each other and from other S&P500 companies. Thus, the results are due to 
the specific change in the political landscape.  
One final observation is with respect to whether companies hire political board members right 
before they are about to receive government contracts. The data suggest that this is not the case. In our 
sample, politically connected directors are nominated on average more than 5 years before either 
election.26  
                                                 
24
 The fact that board connections do not represent industry preferences has also been established in Goldman Rocholl and So 
(2007) who show that post election stock returns of companies connected to the winning (losing) party go up (down) above 
those of their industry. 
 
26
 A detailed description of the time trend of board nominations for our sample is provided in Section 2.4. 
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The present study focuses on individual connections of the board as a form of obtaining 
government access. Past studies in the political science literature have argued that companies use political 
donations in much the same way (see literature review below). Hence, our analysis is repeated after 
controlling for political donations. In particular, we classify all companies based on their political 
donations into those that donate more to Republicans, those that donate more to Democrats, and those that 
do not donate. Controlling for this classification we find that whether you donate more to Republicans or 
to Democrats does not explain changes in contract awards but that the political classification of the board 
of directors still remains significant as before. This result is consistent with the findings of Ansolabehere, 
de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003), Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2007) and Goldman, Rocholl, and So 
(2007) who argue that donations do not grant companies access to political power. Furthermore, Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So (2007) show specifically that post election stock returns of companies that donate more 
to the winning (losing) party are positive (negative) but not significantly higher (lower) than their 
industry’s returns. This suggests that companies that donate more to Republicans (Democrats) are in 
industries that stand to benefit from a Republican (Democrat) regime. They also find that the correlation 
between board affiliation to a party and donation to that party is only 6%.  
Lobbying activity, of course, can also impact contract awards. However, as we do not have access 
to such data we cannot test for its importance. If anything this might add noise to our empirical 
specification and make it harder for us to obtain the above results.  
In sum, the paper shows that companies that are connected to the winning party experience an 
increase in their contracts upon a change in control of the House and Senate or upon a change in control 
of the administration, while those connected to the losing party suffer a decrease in their procurement 
contracts following these changes. The results remain significant after controlling for the industry of the 
company as well as for other company characteristics. The paper thus highlights one crucial way in which 
political connections can have a direct influence on company value.  
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Note that we do not argue whether or not these findings are a result of corruption or whether they 
are the result of companies benefiting from natural social connections. We merely wish to point out in this 
paper that connections to the winning (losing) party lead to a statistical increase (decrease) in contracts.    
The process by which politicians can influence the awarding of contracts to specific companies is 
by its nature not a transparent one. For this reason, our paper looks at both an event in which the political 
power changes within the legislative branch and an event in which the political power changes within the 
administration.  
From a formal standpoint, the process of awarding government contracts begins when an agency 
of the federal government identifies a need for a purchase of a good or service.  Each agency has a 
contracting officer who posts a solicitation on the Federal Business Opportunities website. Companies 
then submit their offers for review by agency personnel who evaluate the alternative offers and make the 
final decision.27 
In practice, there are many ways in which connected companies can influence the design and 
award of contracts. For example, according to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the government 
encourages bidding companies to interact with government agencies prior to the agency putting out its 
Request For Proposal (RFP). The purpose of this is to help the government in defining its needs. This, 
however, allows connected companies to help shape the RFP and thus increase the chances that they 
would win the contract. In addition to this, contractors can approach different Congressional Committees 
with requests to increase funding for goods and services that they provide. Finally, lawmakers often write 
letters of recommendations on behalf of contractors (albeit for the most part generic ones).28 Thus, as both 
legislators and administration officials have some capacity to influence contract awards, the goal of this 
paper is to see whether or not there is empirical evidence that connected companies benefit in this 
dimension. 
                                                 
27
 For more details on this process see Halchin (2006). 
 
28
 See Palmer (2005).    
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The situation in which companies may succeed in influencing the allocation of government 
contracts is one example of the more general case in which an interest group may use non-market 
interactions to achieve certain goals (see Baron, 1999).  
Political scientists have mostly focused on how political donations and lobbying activity 
influence the government. For example, Snyder (1990) shows both theoretically and empirically that 
political donations are a form of investment. In particular, he shows that politicians with a higher 
probability of winning receive more donations. More recent work by Ansolabehere, de Figueirdo, and 
Snyder (2003) (see also references therein) suggest that patterns of political donations are not consistent 
with an investment that aims to gain a financial return but rather reflect a mechanism through which 
donating groups express their political preferences. Consistent with this view, Ansolabehere, Snyder, and 
Ueda (2004), Aggrawal, Meschke, and Wang (2007), and Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2007) all find that 
political donations do not benefit shareholders.29 Stratmann (2005) provides a summary of the literature 
which relates donations to indirect measures of firm value such as the probability of passing a favorable 
congressional vote.  
Although much research has focused on political donations, Groseclose, Milyo, and Primo (2000) 
argue that companies’ expenditures on lobbying activities far outweigh their soft money or PAC 
contributions. Thus, it would seem more likely that companies attempt to influence the government via 
their lobbying activity rather than through their donations. Work by Wright (1990), Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999), de Figueiredo and Silverman (2002), and Drope and Hansen (2004), to name a few, all find 
evidence that is consistent with lobbying activity being a powerful tool used to influence the transfer of 
government resources to various industry groups.30  
We add to this literature by focusing on company-level connections rather than industry-level 
ones. Furthermore, unlike most of the above work we explore the direct monetary reward that accrues to 
                                                 
29
 One notable exception are Gulen, Cooper, and Ovtchinnikov (2007) who show that the number of individuals the company 
donates to can impact long term stock returns. 
 
30
 See also the theoretical work of Grossman and Helpman (1994) that models the optimal lobbying behavior of interest groups.  
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the company (somewhat similar to De Figueiredo and Silverman 2002 who show this in the context of 
universities lobbying).   
Perhaps more closely related to our work is the growing literature that demonstrates the 
importance of political connections for companies. As mentioned earlier, Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001), 
Faccio (2006), Jayachandran (2006), and Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2007) all use event studies to 
demonstrate that the change in the strength of the political connection of a company (either due to a 
company event or a market-wide political event) is followed by a corresponding change in the company’s 
stock price.31  
Establishing political connections for the purpose of receiving favorable government treatment 
can be viewed (in the extreme case) as one form of corruption. Several authors analyzed the theoretical 
causes and consequences of corruption. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show how corruption 
affects government resource allocation and economic development. Banerjee (1997) argues that it is 
optimal to define an activity as being corrupt (illegal) in cases where the government has a role in solving 
a market failure. Ades and Di Tella (1999) analyze the incentive to engage in corrupt activity as a 
function of the competitiveness of the bribing firm’s market and the magnitude of the resulting industry 
rents. Finally, Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) demonstrate that corruption can arise as part of the second 
best equilibrium exactly in those markets in which the government attempts to intervene and solve 
socially inefficient market failures.  
Most closely related to this paper are studies by Khwaja and Mian (2005) and Faccio, Masulis, 
and McConnell (2006) who show several direct ways in which companies benefit from having political 
connections. 32  In particular, Khwaja and Mian (2005) demonstrate that companies in Pakistan with 
political connections receive more loans and default on these loans at a much higher rate relative to non-
                                                 
31
 Fisman, Fisman, Galef, and Khurana (2007) demonstrate that this is not the case for companies that are connected to Vice 
President Dick Cheney. Kroszner and Stratmann (1988) provide indirect evidence that politics matter in the US by looking at 
the competition among interest groups and how they donate to political institutions. 
 
32
 Shleifer and Vishny (1994) analyze theoretically the opposite case in which politicians use their connections to a company in 
order to further their political objectives while Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and Thesmar (2006) show empirically that 
politically connected companies can help their politicians.   
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connected companies, suggesting that these loans are granted based on political considerations. Similarly, 
Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) look at a cross-country sample of bankrupt companies that are 
politically connected and show that these companies are much more likely to get bailed out. While our 
study complements the above two papers, it differs from them in two key ways. First, this study focuses 
on the value created by political connections in the U.S. which is a country with a strong legal system and 
relatively low levels of corruption. Second, our study considers a different and perhaps more direct source 
of political rents: government contracts. 
Finally, Karpoff, Lee, and Vendrzyk (1999) provide evidence on the treatment of companies who 
receive government defense procurement contracts and then commit fraud in an attempt to deceive the 
government. They show that the penalty incurred by these companies is much less severe if the company 
is in the group of the top 100 government contractors. While their paper suggests that having large 
government contracts provides the company with preferential treatment, our paper finds that the source of 
the preferential treatment might be the company’s board connections which result in large contracts.      
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In Section 2 we describe the data in more detail and 
specify the empirical methodology. In Section 3 we highlight the key findings of the paper and discuss 
their interpretation. Section 4 describes several robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Data description 
The analyses in this paper utilize two event periods and two types of data. The first event period 
spans the time around the 1994 midterm election, while the second event period covers the time around 
the 2000 presidential election. The first data set comprises information on all U.S. government 
procurement contracts in the sample period between 1990 and 2004. The second data set consists of 
original data containing information regarding the political affiliation of each board member of all 
companies in the S&P500 at the end of 1994 and at the end of 2000. Both data sets are described in more 
detail below. In addition, we hand-collect information regarding the subsidiaries of all S&P500 
companies in 1994 and 2000 and obtain CRSP and COMPUSTAT data as well as Fama-French industry 
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classification data. Finally, the SDC Platinum database by Thompson Financial is used for checking 
merger and acquisition activities or divestitures by S&P500 companies in the sample period. 
 
2.1. Procurement data 
Procurement contract data on the company level are available from the Federal Procurement Data 
System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG).33 The FPDS-NG, which is operated and maintained by Global 
Computer Enterprises, replaced the Federal Procurement Data Center (FPDC).34 The FPDS-NG contains 
all procurement contracts that are awarded by the U.S. Government and that exceed an individual 
transaction value of $2,500.35 The largest exceptions to this reporting requirement are the U.S. Postal 
Service and several legislative and judicial branch organizations. 36  FPDS-NG reports procurement 
contracts for each company that is a separate legal entity, independent of the ultimate owner of that 
company. This means that procurement contracts for subsidiaries of companies are not aggregated on the 
parent company level, which aggravates the use of these data for the purpose of academic research. The 
exact matching procedure used in this paper is described in detail in sections 2.2. and 2.3. 
Table 10 shows the aggregate value and number of procurement contracts over the sample period 
between 1990 and 2004. The yearly value increases substantially over the sample period from $158 
billion in 1990 to $351 billion in 2004. In particular, it increases greatly after 2001 as a result of the 
increased spending following the events of September 11, 2001. Similarly, the number of procurement 
contracts increases from 371,514 in 1990 to 2,843,212 in 2004. The total number of procurement 
contracts in the sample period exceeds 11.5 million and the aggregate value is more than $3.1 trillion. 
                                                 
33
  A "procurement contract" is any of a number of documented legal interactions between the government and a contractor 
including a "contract award" (the basic terms and conditions of the contract including the goods and services to be provided), a 
"modification" (which may be an exercise of an option to modify the contract), or an "order" (for example an order against a 
government-wide contract). 
 
34
 FPDC, implemented under Public Law 93-400, provides data for Congress, the Executive branch, the private sector, and the 
public. FPDC was a part of the U.S. General Services Administration and operated and maintained the original Federal 
Procurement Data System. FPDS-NG is the central repository of statistical information on federal contracting.  
 
35
 The reporting threshold for individual transactions was $25,000 before 2004. 
36
 US Census Bureau reports total procurement amount annually in the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) but no 
detailed data on the company level are available. The total procurement amount in FPDS-NG covers more than 85% of the total 
amount in CFFR over the sample period.  
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Table 10 also shows which departments award the major share of these procurement contracts. The 
defense department is by far the largest contractor with an average share of 65% of the awarded value, 
followed by the Energy Department with an average share of 10% and NASA with an average share of 
5%. Note that defense-related spending is broadly defined and can include contracts with many non-
defense companies such as IBM and Compaq. Other departments comprise the remaining 20% share. The 
figures in Table 10 suggest that the share of the Defense Department is relatively stable over time, with a 
maximum of 68.9% in 2004 and a minimum of 58.8% in 1993; this is the year when NASA is awarded its 
highest relative share in any of the sample years. 
 
2.2. Subsidiary data  
Many companies receive a substantial share of their procurement contracts through their 
subsidiaries. As an example, Halliburton receives aggregate procurement contracts of $7 million in 1998, 
while its subsidiary KBR receives procurement contracts of $43 million in the same year. For this reason, 
we collect information on all subsidiaries of S&P500 companies from Exhibit 21 (Subsidiaries of the 
Registrant) of their annual 10-K reports. These are available in the EDGAR database of the SEC. S&P 
500 companies and their subsidiaries are then matched with the list of companies in the FPDS-NG 
database.37 The procurement contracts of S&P500 companies and their subsidiaries are finally summed up 
to obtain the aggregate value of procurement contracts for each company in the S&P500 and for each year 
over the sample period. 
 
2.3. Resulting sample 
This procedure results in a total sample of 411 S&P500 companies that receive procurement 
contracts in the period between 1990 and 1998 and a total of 412 companies that receive procurement 
contracts in the period between 1996 and 2004. For the first event period, 17 of the 411 companies have 
                                                 
37
 The procurement data used in this paper are based on the September 2006 status of FPDS-NG. 
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procurement contracts of less than one million dollars in aggregate throughout the 1990-1998 period and 
are therefore excluded from the sample. Furthermore, a number of companies are involved in substantial 
merger and acquisition activities or divestitures over the sample period. To ensure consistency and 
comparability of the procurement contracts of these companies over time, their procurement contracts are 
adjusted in the following way. First, 22 companies in the S&P500 are acquired by other companies in the 
S&P500 during the sample period. In this case, the procurement contracts of the target company are 
added to those of the acquiring company before the merger and are thus comparable to the procurement 
contracts of the combined entity after the merger.38 Second, 45 companies in the S&P500 are acquired by 
non-S&P500 companies and are thus excluded from the sample. Third, over the sample period 8 S&P500 
companies sell units or divisions in which the transaction value exceeds one billion dollars. To ensure the 
comparability of the awarded government contracts, these companies are excluded as well. The final 
sample for the first event period thus consists of 319 companies.   
For the second event period, the same criteria are applied. Out of the 412 sample companies, 47 
are excluded as they are awarded procurement contracts of less than one million dollar in the event period. 
Another 12 companies merge with other S&P500 companies, and thus the procurement contracts of these 
target companies are added to those of the acquiring companies. An additional 15 companies are further 
excluded; 8 companies merge with non-S&P500 companies, and 7 companies sell units or divisions with 
a transaction value of more than one billion dollars. After excluding these companies, the final sample 
results in a total of 338 companies.     
 
2.4. Board data 
Board connections are derived by considering the composition of the board of directors at the end 
of 1994 and 2000 of all S&P500 companies with procurement contracts and analyzing the background of 
each board member. Section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Act requires 
                                                 
38
 For these companies, the accounting variables such as sales, assets, EBITD, capital expenditure, and book-to-market ratio are 
adjusted in the same way. 
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companies to file a definite proxy statement (submission type Def 14a), containing information about 
their board members. These filings, which are hand-collected from the EDGAR database of the SEC, 
contain a brief description of each board member’s career background. Based on these data, it is possible 
to identify whether board members are connected to the Republicans, to the Democrats, or to neither. A 
board member is defined as being politically connected if he or she at any time prior to 1994 and 2000, 
respectively, held a position such as Senator, Member of the House of Representatives, Member of the 
Administration, or was a Director of an organization such as the CIA, SEC, or FDA. A full list of these 
positions is provided in Table 11. 
Panel a) of Table 11 shows the descriptive statistics for the 319 sample companies used in the 
analysis of the 1994 midterm election. According to the definition used in this paper, 79 of the 319 
companies are connected to the Republican Party as they have at least one board member with a former 
political position with the Republicans, but no board member with a former position with the Democratic 
Party. Similarly, 36 companies are defined as being connected to the Democratic Party as they have at 
least one board member connected to the Democrats, but no board member connected to the Republicans. 
The remaining 204 companies are connected either to both parties (30 companies) or to neither (174 
companies). Note that the expectation is that companies connected to both parties should not exhibit any 
change in contracts. This is true as long as the strength of their connection to one party is the same as the 
strength of their connection to the other. While a separate analysis of these companies is interesting in 
principle, the fact that some have strong connections to one party and weak connections to the other 
implies that a further classification of this group does not generate any conclusive statistical results. The 
descriptive statistics in Panel a) show that, on average, companies that are connected to the Republicans 
tend to be larger than those that are connected to the Democrats. 
Panel b) of Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics for the 338 sample companies used in the 
analysis of the 2000 presidential election. While 54 companies are connected only to the Republicans, 35 
companies are connected only to the Democrats. The remaining 249 sample companies are either 
connected to both parties (23 companies) or to neither (226 companies). Panel b) also confirms the 
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evidence from Panel a) that companies that are connected to the Republicans tend to be larger than 
companies that are connected to the Democrats. 
As mentioned earlier the industry distribution of Republican and Democratic firms is relatively 
evenly distributed (see Figure 1) in both years and this suggests that there is no major concern about 
Republican or Democrat companies representing industry preferences that are correlated with the agenda 
of one of the two parties. A more formal chi-square test finds that the two distributions are not statistically 
different from each other (p-values of 0.9 for 1994 and 0.6 for 2000).  
Finally, while not reported in the table there are only 5 companies that switch from being 
connected to one party in 1994 to another party in 2000. Thus, political connections seem to be long-term 
connections. 
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics of the timing of nominations. Panel a) of Table 12 shows 
that former politicians are hired long before either of the events studied. On average, these directors are 
on the board more than five years before the elections. Panel b) of Table 12 describes the timing of 
nominations relative to the presidential and legislative cycles. In particular, the table shows several key 
points. First, most of the nominations occur in a year following a presidential or a midterm election. More 
than 60% of the nominations (230 out of 371) occur in the year following a presidential or midterm 
election. Second, while the number of nominations of Republican (Democratic) board members is nearly 
the same under Republican or Democratic Presidents, Republicans (Democrats) are much more likely to 
be nominated in times of Democratic (Republican) control of house and senate. For example, under 
Republican senate majority 69 out of 134 nominations are of Republican board members, representing 52% 
of the total. However, under Democratic senate majority 175 out of 237 nominations are of Republican 
board members, representing 74% of the total. Thus, a higher percent of Republicans are nominated 
during a period of Democratic majority. 
The numbers above suggest that nominations are driven more by supply than by demand. 
Demand-driven nominations would imply more Republican (Democratic) nominations under Republican 
(Democratic) regimes, while supply-driven nominations would potentially imply the opposite because the 
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supply of former Republicans (Democrats) is higher when Democrats (Republicans) win the majority. 
Thus, it would seem that politicians do not get hired when they are most valuable (right at the beginning 
of their party’s rule) but rather when they become available. This is consistent with a situation in which 
there is a limited supply of politicians who companies view as both able and willing to use their 
connections for the benefit of a specific company. 
Table 13 reports the value of the procurement contracts for the sample companies for the two 
event periods. The figures in the left column of Panel a) show that S&P500 companies receive 
procurement contracts totaling more than $475 billion between 1990 and 1998. This represents a 
substantial share of the $1,552 billion of total procurement contracts in FPDS-NG over that period. The 
highest share of the contracts goes to Republican companies even though there are only 79 Republican 
companies as compared to 204 companies classified as others.  
The column on the right hand side of the table reports average numbers. These figures suggest 
that the mean value of procurement contracts to Republican companies is substantially higher than that to 
Democratic companies, which is itself higher than that for the rest of the companies. The average value of 
procurement contracts for the three groups over the sample period amounts to $3,771 million, $882 
million, and $716 million, respectively. These figures suggest the existence of a positive correlation 
between the political connections of a company and the value of its government procurement contracts.  
While the average value of procurement contracts in the pre-election period between 1990 and 
1993 is about $589 million, it increases to $732 million in the post-election period between 1995 and 
1998. However, there is a remarkable difference between Republican and Democratic companies. While 
the average Republican company experiences an increase of $504 million in procurement contracts, the 
average Democratic company suffers a decrease of $75 million. Other companies see an average increase 
of $42 million.  
Panel b) of Table 13 presents the statistics for the second event period between 1996 and 2004. 
The numbers exhibit similar patterns as in Panel a). The highest value of procurement contracts is 
awarded again to Republican companies. They receive on average $3,908 million over the sample period. 
   
46 
 
While companies with Republican boards receive on average $1,495 million worth of procurement 
contracts between 1996 and 1999, this number increases by 35.0% to $2,018 million between 2001 and 
2004. This growth rate is much higher than the 10.9% growth rate for Democratic companies. A 
seemingly surprising result can be found for the third group, which comprises the companies that are 
connected either to both parties or to neither. These companies experience the largest average increase of 
58.1% in their procurement contracts.  
A further examination of this group shows that this last figure is almost entirely due to three 
companies, which are connected to both parties: Boeing, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. They 
receive more than $280 billion worth of procurement contracts between 1996 and 2004. Excluding these 
companies from the third group leads to a decrease in the value of procurement contracts from $518 
billion to $236 billion and a drop in the growth rate from 58.1% to 20.7%. This last growth rate is 
substantially lower than the growth rate for Republican companies. The fact that a small number of 
companies may have a substantial impact on the overall averages is of crucial importance in the design 
and specification of an appropriate empirical test. This will be described in the next section.  
Overall, these figures provide the first piece of evidence suggesting that political connections of 
companies may influence how procurement contracts are allocated. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to determine whether the political connections of the 
board influence the value of procurement contracts that companies receive a) before and after the change 
in majority in House and Senate following the 1994 midterm election and b) before and after the change 
in Presidency following the 2000 presidential election. The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we show 
univariate results. Second, we present multivariate analyses that control for other variables. 
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3.1. Univariate Results 
The two variables of interest are the change in the value of procurement contracts a) between the 
four-year period before and the four-year period after the 1994 midterm election and b) between the four-
year period before and the four-year period after the 2000 presidential election. To minimize the impact 
of outliers in a specific year and to take into account the long-term nature of public procurement contracts, 
the procurement contracts for each sample company are aggregated over the two four-year periods and 
then compared to each other. The first variable of interest, the change in the value of the sum of 
procurement contracts between the two periods around the 1994 midterm election, is defined as 
= ∑∑
==
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Δ
t
t,i
t
t,ii CCC  -  
where tiC ,  represents the dollar value of procurement contracts for company i in year t.39  
Equivalently, the second variable of interest for the two periods around the 2000 presidential 
election is defined as 
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 As mentioned earlier, this variable turns out to have an uneven distribution across the 
sample companies with some extreme negative and positive values. As an example, the highest negative 
difference for the first event period is found for Perkin Elmer, which loses $6.6 billion in government 
procurement contracts; the highest positive difference is found for Lockheed Martin, which gains $29.2 
billion in these contracts. More formally, we test whether the two variables of interest are normally 
distributed using the Shapiro-Wilk and the Shapiro-Francia test. The tests reject this null hypothesis at the 
1% level for either of the sample periods. The variables exhibit significant levels of skewness and kurtosis 
which need to be taken into account in the design of the empirical specification. To deal with these 
extreme values in the univariate statistics, the sample is thus divided into five groups with the same 
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 Note that the election year is not included in the calculation of the dependent variable to eliminate any potential abnormal 
behavior in an election year.  
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number of companies in each group. Companies are sorted into these five groups based on the value of 
iC∆ . For example, Group 1 comprises those companies with the lowest iC∆  implying that companies in 
this group have experienced the lowest increase or the highest decrease in the value of their contracts.  
Panel a) of Table 14 shows that for the 1994 event the average difference for the companies in 
Group 1 is indeed negative, i.e. they receive less procurement contracts after the midterm election relative 
to before the election. As Panel a) further indicates, the same is true for Group 2 although here the 
difference is obviously less negative than that for the first group. Group 3 contains those companies that 
do not experience a major change in the value of their procurement contracts in the pre- and post-election 
period. Finally, companies in Group 4 and Group 5 receive substantially more procurement contracts after 
the election than before the election.  
Panel a) also shows the distribution of Republican and Democratic companies across the five 
groups. The number of Democratic companies almost monotonically decreases from 12 in the first group 
to 4 in the fifth group. This suggests that Democratic companies are overrepresented among those 
companies that lose procurement contracts. By contrast, the highest number of Republican companies can 
be found in the highest group while the lowest number can be found in the second-lowest group. This 
suggests that Republican companies are overrepresented among those companies that receive more 
government procurement contracts following the election.  
Panel b) of Table 14 shows the respective figures for the 2000 event period. In line with the 
results for the first event period, the average difference is negative for companies in Group 1 and Group 2, 
it becomes slightly positive for companies in Group 3, and it is substantially positive for companies in 
Group 4 and in particular in Group 5. While there are slightly more Democratic than Republican 
companies in Group 1 and Group 2, the number of Republican companies significantly outweighs the 
number of Democratic companies in Group 4 and Group 5. This means that Republican companies are 
also overrepresented among those companies that gain procurement contracts after the 2000 presidential 
election. 
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In the following section, we consider the statistical significance of these changes when 
controlling for other company and industry characteristics. 
 
3.2. Multivariate results 
The previous section documents that the change in procurement contracts before and after the 
1994 (2000) midterm election (presidential election) has a non-normal distribution with some extreme 
negative and positive outliers. For the multivariate analysis of the impact of political connections on the 
value of procurement contracts, the dependent variable is thus defined as the log of the change in the sum 
of procurement contracts between the two periods around the 1994 midterm election: 
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The equivalent variable for the change in procurement contracts around the 2000 presidential 
election is defined as:  
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While this choice of the dependent variable better addresses the uneven distribution of the raw 
variable, it maintains its cardinality. In the robustness section, we report results for a different 
specification of the dependent variable.  There, we use an ordered logit model in which the dependent 
variable is an ordinal variable that takes a value of 1 to 5 based on a company’s classification into one of 
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the five ∆ groups for the respective event period. As the robustness section will show, the results are 
qualitatively the same for the two dependent variables. 
The independent variables of interest are two dummy variables: dRep takes a value of one if a 
company has at least one board member connected to the Republicans, but no board member connected to 
the Democrats and a value of zero otherwise; dDem takes a value of one if a company has at least one 
board member connected to the Democrats, but no board member connected to the Republicans and a 
value of zero otherwise.  
In addition, the paper uses a number of control variables. The first variable is lnCap, which 
captures the log of the size of the company.40 The second variable, BM, represents the company’s book-
to-market ratio. The Herfindahl index is included in order to take into account the intensity of competition 
in the industry in which the company operates. This index is calculated based on the sales of all 
competitors with the same 2-digit SIC code. In order to control for the investment level, the profitability, 
and the cost structure of the company, three accounting variables are included as further independent 
variables. The first accounting variable is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales, which controls for the 
possibility that a company that has recently invested in its facilities is expected to subsequently increase 
its production. The second variable is the ratio of EBITD to assets, which takes into account the 
possibility that a government agency may award procurement contracts to healthy companies that can be 
expected to survive in the long-run. The third accounting variable is the ratio of cost of goods sold to sales, 
which is important to consider as cost-efficient producers are more likely to be awarded with procurement 
contracts. Finally, to control for the possibility that Republican and Democratic are simply on different 
growth trajectories, we control for the growth in sales in the two-year period before the election.41 More 
formally, we use variations of the following empirical specification: 
                                                 
40
 In the robustness section, we control for more flexible functional forms of size. 
 
41
 Alternatively, we control for the growth in firm size and in procurement contracts in the two-year period before the election. 
The results, which are available upon request, do not change.   
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where  ∆  is the log of the change in the sum of procurement contracts between the two 
periods before and after the 1994 (2000) midterm (presidential) election. 
Table 15 reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis for the 1994 midterm election. Model 1 
and Model 2 include the Republican and Democratic dummy variable, respectively, as well as the first 
three control variables. The coefficient for the Republican dummy variable is positive and significant at 
the 1% level, while the coefficient for the Democratic dummy variable is negative and significant at the 5% 
level. This suggests that Republican companies are more likely to experience an increase in government 
contracts in the post-election period, while Democratic companies are more likely to experience a 
decrease in government contracts in this period. Model 3 includes both political dummy variables at the 
same time showing that they remain significant, although the Democratic dummy variable is now 
significant at the 10% level.42  
Model 4 also includes the second and third accounting ratio, EBITD to assets and cost of goods 
sold to sales, respectively. While neither of these variables proves to be significant, the two variables of 
interest remain significant at their previous levels. The same holds for Model 5, which also includes the 
growth in sales as an additional control variable. The coefficient for this control variable is significant at 
the 5% level and thus suggests that companies that are on a growth trajectory before the election increase 
their government procurement awards after the election. The more important result for the purpose of this 
study is that the Republican and Democratic dummy variables remain significant even after controlling 
for the pre-election sales growth. 
The coefficient for the Herfindahl index is positive and significant throughout the different 
models. This suggests that the lower is the level of competition in the industry in which a company 
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 Note that these two variables are negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient of -0.2046 (p-value = 0.0002) such that the 
significance of the coefficients decreases. 
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operates the more likely the company is to gain more government contracts. Thus, it is easier for a 
company to gain market shares for government contracts in a less competitive industry. 
In Models 6 to 8, interaction variables are included to test for the heterogeneity in the types of 
political connections. We concentrate here on companies with connections to the Republican Party as the 
winning party in the 1994 election and define three interaction variables. The first interaction variable 
considers companies in which the Republican board member had a political career in the defense sector; 
this includes all the former Republican politicians who worked for the department of defense. The second 
interaction variable focuses on companies in which the Republican board member was a congressman or 
senator. This is particularly important for the 1994 midterm election. Finally, the third interaction variable 
deals with companies that are headquartered in a state with a Republican majority in the 1994 senate 
election. The results show that none of these interaction variables proves to be significant and that the 
Republican dummy variable remains significant in each specification. This suggests that it is only 
important to have a political connection, independent of the exact nature of this political connection.  
In addition to controlling for the variables described above, it is also important to rule out the 
possibility that Republican and Democratic companies happen to be in certain industries that benefit from 
an increase or suffer from a decrease in government spending. In this case, the observed pattern would not 
be due to a company’s political affiliation, but simply due to the industry in which it operates. As 
discussed previously, the industry distribution of Republican companies is not statistically different from 
the industry distribution of Democratic companies.  
To address the industry impact more rigorously, the estimations in Model 9 and Model 10 include 
industry controls as additional explanatory variables. In Model 9, dummy variables are included for each 
of the industries in the Fama-French 30-industry classification.43 In Model 10, dummy variables are 
included for companies only in those industries in which Republican companies appear to be 
overrepresented in 1994 based on the Fama-French 30-industry classification shown in Figure 1: 1 (Food 
Products), 8 (Healthcare, Medical Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products), 19 (Petroleum and Natural Gas), 
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 To be precise, 29 dummy variables are included in order to avoid redundancy. 
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20 (Utilities), 24 (Business Supplies and Shipping Containers), and 29 (Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, 
Trading). Only in these industries there are at least five companies that are connected to the Republicans. 
The results in Model 9 and Model 10 show that the earlier findings remain true even after controlling for 
an industry effect. The coefficients for the Republican and Democratic dummy variables are again 
significant at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  This suggests that the results for the 1994 midterm 
election are not driven by the change in government spending in the specific industry that happens to 
comprise companies with a particular political preference.  
Finally, in model 11 we include controls for the political donations made by each company. 
Specifically, we add two dummy variables dDonDem and dDonRep. The first variable gets the value of 1 
if the company donates more to Democrats than to Republicans and zero otherwise. The second variable 
is defined similarly. Model 11 shows that donations do not have any impact on contract awards while 
board affiliations remain as before.  
Thus, the inclusion of control variables does not change the main statement that Republican 
companies are more likely to increase the value of their procurement contracts after the 1994 midterm 
election, while Democratic companies are more likely to lose contracts. 
Table 16 reports the results for the estimation for the second event period, which captures the 
time before and after the 2000 presidential election. The explanatory variables are the same variables as in 
Table 15. The only exception is the interaction variable in Model 7, which differs from that in Model 7 in 
Table 15 as it takes into account Republican board members with a former career in the government, 
reflecting the nature of the 2000 election as a presidential election. The results suggest that Republican 
companies significantly increase their government procurement contracts after the election. The 
coefficient for the Republican dummy variable is significant for each specification, almost always at least 
at the 5% level. At the same time, the coefficient for the Democratic companies, while negative, fails to 
be statistically significant. 
Using the same methodology as for the analysis in Table 15, Model 9 and Model 10 in Table 16 
comprise industry controls for the event of the 2000 presidential election. In Model 9, dummy variables 
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are again included for each of the industries in the Fama-French 30-industry classification. In Model 10, 
dummy variables are again included for companies only in those industries in which Republican 
companies appear to be overrepresented in 2000 based on the Fama-French 30-industry-classification. As 
shown in Figure 1, these are the same six industries in 2000 as in 1994. Only in these six industries there 
are at least four companies that are connected to the Republicans in 2000. The results show that the 
Republican dummy variable is significant even at the 1% level in both specifications, while the 
Democratic dummy variable is negative, but fails to be significant. These results suggest, consistent with 
the results for the 1994 midterm election, that the observed effect is not driven by specific industries.  
Overall, the empirical results suggest that companies that are connected to the Republican Party 
benefit from the Republican win in the 1994 midterm election as well as the Republican win in the 2000 
presidential election. They receive more government contracts following the two respective elections. By 
contrast, companies connected to the Democratic Party lose government contracts after the elections. 
These results are robust to a number of control factors that capture both company- and industry-specific 
characteristics. In particular, the results are robust to industry controls and seem to be driven by political 
affiliations rather than changes in procurement contracts across industries. 
 
4. Further tests and robustness 
This section presents a number of robustness tests that are described in more detail below. 
 
4.1. Choice of the dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the multivariate estimations is the log of the change in the sum of 
procurement contracts between the two periods before and after the 1994 (2000) midterm (presidential) 
election. The choice of this dependent variable addresses the issue of the existence of extreme negative 
and positive outliers in the raw variable, while maintaining the cardinality of the observations. An 
alternative estimation technique is to transfer the cardinal into an ordinal variable. For robustness, the 
multivariate estimations are rerun as ordered logit models where the dependent variable is now a number 
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between 1 and 5 depending on which of the five iC∆  groups the company falls in to. This ordinal 
classification is the same one used in the univariate tests in section 3.1. The rest of the control variables 
are exactly the same variables as before.  
The results of this estimation, which are available upon request, are the same as before. The 
Republican dummy variable is positive and significant for both the 1994 and 2000 election, while the 
Democratic dummy variable is negative for both elections, but significant only for the 1994 election. 
Thus, the results are robust to a different specification of the dependent variable. 
 
4.2. Type of companies and different trajectories 
In the empirical estimations, we control for various company-specific factors to address the 
possibility that the observed differences in changes in procurement contracts between Republican and 
Democratic companies might not be due to their political connections, but rather due to the fact that these 
firms are different from each other and on potentially different trajectories. We perform additional tests to 
rule out this possibility.  
First, we allow for more flexible functional forms of size. While we control for the size of the 
company in our estimations, it might be that only certain size groups benefit or suffer from a change in 
procurement contracts. Therefore, we create size quintiles (deciles) for our sample companies and include 
dummies for these quintiles (deciles). The results, which are available upon request, do not materially 
change. The sign and significance of the political dummy variables remains the same, which suggests that 
the results hold true also for more flexible forms of size.  
Second, to address the possibility that Republican companies experience an increase in 
procurement contracts and Democratic companies experience a decrease in procurement contracts over 
the sample period irrespective of the two political events, we create an artificial placebo event that is 
unaffected by any election. We choose the year 1997 as the placebo event, which covers a 3-year period 
before and after with no change in the political landscape. If the documented results were simply due to 
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different trajectories for Republican and Democratic companies, the coefficients for both parties should 
be significant not only for the 1994 or 2000 event, but also for the 1997 placebo event. The results of the 
estimation for this event, are reported in Table 17. These results show that neither the coefficient for the 
Republican nor the one for the Democratic companies proves to be significant. Thus, it is not the time 
trend that generates the results but rather the specific political changes occurring in the election years. 44 
 
4.3. Different types of political connections 
There are several other ways in which a company may become politically connected, e.g. through 
indirect ways such as lobbyists and consultants, or through other direct ways such as donations. As 
mentioned in the introduction, existing studies provide at best mixed evidence on whether donations help 
companies in becoming politically connected. Furthermore, even if they do, Jayachandran (2006) raises 
the question whether donations have a causal effect on firm value or simply represent industry 
preferences. Consistent with the latter, Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2007) show that donations lose their 
explanatory power once the industry effect is taken into account. For a robustness test, we collect 
donation data, for the 1994 and 2000 elections, from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), a non-
partisan research organization that collects information on corporate donations to the Republican and 
Democratic Party. We then construct a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a party assigns more 
than 50% of its donations to the Republican Party and a value of zero otherwise. This variable is included 
in the estimation along with the board connection variable. The results, which can be seen in model 11 of 
tables 15 and 16  show that the donation variables are not significant, while the board connections 
variables remains significant. As a further robustness test we create a continuous donation variable which 
records for each company the percentage amount donated to Republicans out of the total political 
donations made by that company. The results, available upon request, remain the same.   
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 The third potential way to address the issue of different trajectories would be to consider only those companies that are 
Republican (Democratic) in 1994 and Democratic (Republican) in 2000. However, as mentioned before, the whole sample only 
comprises 5 companies that fit these criteria.   
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4.4. First event period 
One last point is that the period before the 1994 election comprises two different presidencies: a 
Republican presidency until 1992 and a Democratic Presidency after 1992. However, this setting imposes 
an even higher hurdle to find any evidence for the political influence on the allocation of procurement 
contracts. For robustness we repeat the analysis using the years 1993 and 1994 as the pre-period and the 
years 1995 to 1998 as the post-period. As the two periods do not have the same duration, we use as the 
dependent variable the log of the change in the average annual amount in contracts between the period 
from 1993 to 1994 and the period from 1995 to 1998. The results on the Republican and Democratic 
dummy variables remain as before.  
 
5. Conclusion 
As government intervention in economic activity can result in a significant reallocation of 
resources, some companies have the incentive to become politically connected. In previous studies, these 
connections have been shown to result in an increase in shareholder value as measured by changes in 
company stock prices around political events.  
This paper takes a first step in disentangling the source of this value by identifying one direct way 
in which political connections affect the value of the largest U.S. publicly traded companies. Based on the 
analysis of the individuals who serve on the board of directors of all S&P500 companies, the paper 
classifies these companies into those that are connected to the Democrats and those that are connected to 
the Republicans. The paper asks whether political connections affect the allocation of procurement 
contracts awarded to these companies following the 1994 midterm election in which majority control in 
House and Senate shifts from the Democratic to the Republican Party and following the 2000 presidential 
election in which the Presidency shifts from the Democratic to the Republican Party. 
The main findings are that following the 1994 midterm election and the 2000 presidential election 
Republican companies are more likely to experience an increase in the total value of their procurement 
contracts while Democratic companies are more likely to experience a respective decrease. These results 
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remain statistically significant after controlling for company characteristics as well as for the industry in 
which the company operates. 
The results suggest that, even within the confine of the strong legal system of the U.S., political 
connections have a significant impact on the allocation of government resources.  
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Table 1: Board connections 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the S&P 500 companies in the year 2000 sorted based on the political connections of 
their board members. The reported values for Market Cap, Sales, Assets, and P/E Ratio are measured as of the end of 1999. This 
information is (partly) missing for seven companies. A company is classified as politically connected if it has at least one board 
member with the following former position: President (Gerald R. Ford), Presidential (Vice-Presidential) Candidate, Senator, 
Member of the House of Representatives, (Assistant) Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Under Secretary, 
Associate Director, Governor, Director (CIA, FEMA), Deputy Director (CIA, OMB), Commissioner (IRS, NRC, SSA, CRC, 
FDA, SEC), Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador, Mayor, Staff (White House, President, Presidential campaign), 
Chairman of the Party Caucus, Chairman or Staff of the Presidential Election campaign, and Chairman or member of the 
President’s Committee/Council. A company is classified as Pure Rep (Pure Dem) if it has only Republican (Democratic) 
affiliated board members.  
 
 
Independent 
companies 
Connected 
companies 
Pure Rep 
companies 
Pure Dem 
companies 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Market Cap (in $ Million) 20,894 7,246 32,028 10,201 31,270 10,693 21,621 7,784 
Sales (in $ Million) 9,014 4,534 15,308 8,640 13,931 8,520 14,267 6,103 
Assets (in $ Million) 23,545 6,140 37,137 13,077 21,747 12.079 49,792 15,149 
P/E Ratio 35.6 19.8 33.0 19.6 38.1 22.2 24.5 14.9 
Number of Companies 340 340 153 153 78 78 47 47 
Tenure of politically 
connected board members 
(years) 
NA NA 5.48 5.5 6.07 6.5 3.32 3.5 
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Table 2: Donations 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample of donating companies. The reported values for Market Cap, Sales, Assets, 
and P/E Ratio are measured as of the end of 1999. Donation data are provided by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) and 
are based on information furnished by the Federal Election Commission regarding political contributions to the two parties that 
exceed $200. These contributions come from Political Action Committees (PACs), soft money donors, and individuals in the 
1999-2000 election cycle. For each election cycle, the CRP defines 80 industries and provides information on the 20 largest 
contributors in each of these industries. A company is included in the sample if it belongs to these contributors, it is publicly 
listed, and its total donations exceed $100,000.  
 
  Population Sample companies 
a) Donations   
Total Donations (in $1,000) 1,634,288 245,695 
Republicans (in $1,000) 896,520 157,502 
  in % of Total Donations 54.9 64.1 
Democrats (in $1,000) 722,256 87,764 
  in % of Total Donations 44.2 35.7 
Number of Companies  315 
 
 
  
b) Company characteristics  Mean Median 
Market Cap (in $ Million)  31,478 7,671 
Sales (in $ Million)  13,516 6,288 
Assets (in $ Million)  38,038 9,375 
P/E Ratio 
 
28.5 16.5 
Number of Companies 
 
315 315 
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Table 3: Post-Election CARs of S&P500 companies with board connections 
 
Each company in the S&P 500 index in the year 2000 is classified based on the political connection of members of its board of 
directors. The information about the board of directors is taken from Def 14a filings from the EDGAR database of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). A company is classified as Pure Rep (Pure Dem) if it has only Republican (Democratic) 
affiliated board members. A company is classified as related (not related) if it has at least one (no) board member who served in a 
committee, department, or government agency that deals with the industry in which the nominating company operates. A 
company is classified as Senate/House, Administration if it has at least one board member that served as a senator, member of the 
House, or member of the administration; it is classified as Others if it has at least one board member that served in any other 
political position and no board member that served in Senate/House or Administration. All abnormal returns are adjusted by the 
CRSP value-weighted index. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the value-weighted portfolio are weighted by the value 
of each company, and the CARs of the equally-weighted portfolio are equally weighted across the companies. The estimation 
period is from day 300 to day 46 before the 2000 Presidential Election Day, while the test period is from 1 day until 7 days after 
the Election Day. All company returns and index returns are taken from the CRSP files. Unless indicated otherwise, t-values are 
in parentheses. Symbols $, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Connection type 
Number 
of 
companies 
Equally-weighted CAR(%)  Value-weighted CAR(%) 
(+1,+2) (+1,+3) (+1,+5) (+1,+7)  (+1,+2) (+1,+3) (+1,+5) (+1,+7) 
a) Exclusivity of Connection          
  Pure Rep (A) 78  2.80  4.69  3.46  5.31   3.10  4.22  3.63  4.94 
  
(6.16**) (8.69**) (4.81**) (6.16**)  (7.00**) (8.12**) (4.93**) (5.73**) 
  Pure Dem (B) 47 -0.41  0.06 -0.51  0.31  -3.99 -4.87 -5.34 -4.36 
  
(0.28) (1.42) (0.39) (1.45)  (6.00**) (5.70**) (5.11**) (3.02**) 
  Difference (A-B)   3.21  4.63  3.97  5.00   7.09  9.09  8.97  9.30 
    (t-value) 
  
(2.56**) (6.71**) (2.94**) (4.49**)  (9.34**) (9.79**) (7.29**) (6.00**) 
b) Relatedness of Republican firm          
  Related (C) 34 3.54 6.10 5.12 7.02  3.49 4.52 6.05 7.00 
  (5.08**) (7.33**) (4.49**) (5.26**)  (4.57**) (5.04**) (4.62**) (4.57**) 
  Not related (D) 44 2.22 3.60 2.18 4.00  2.87 4.04 2.21 3.72 
  (3.74**) (5.13**) (2.46*) (3.58**)  (5.29**) (6.32**) (2.78**) (3.78**) 
  Difference (C-D)   1.32 2.50 2.94 3.02  0.62 0.48 3.84 3.28 
    (t-value)   (1.47) (2.34**) (2.09*) (1.77$)  (0.69) (0.45) (2.66**) (1.90$) 
c) Former Career of connected board of Republican firm        
  Senate/House, 
Administration(E) 44 2.79 4.41 3.05 5.22  3.21 4.52 2.97 5.14 
  
(4.50**) (6.14**) (3.23**) (4.64**)  (5.10**) (6.19**) (3.14**) (4.53**) 
  Others (F) 23 2.84 5.30 3.89 5.82  2.97 4.79 3.27 5.14 
  
(3.30**) (4.96**) (2.73**) (3.31**)  (3.78**) (4.89**) (2.44*) (3.19**) 
  Difference (E-F)  -0.05 -0.89 -0.84 -0.60  0.24 -0.27 -0.30 0.00 
    (t-value) 
 
(-0.05) (-0.72) (-0.51) (-0.30)  (0.23) (-0.22) (-0.19) (0.00) 
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Table 4: Cross-sectional analysis of Post-Election CARs adjusted by the market index 
 
The sample comprises all S&P 500 companies in the year 2000. The dependent variable is the CAR adjusted by the CRSP value-
weighted market index in a period of (+1,+3) days following the 2000 Presidential Election on Nov. 7, 2000. lnCap is the log of 
the company’s market capitalization at the end of 1999. Book to Market is the ratio of book value of equity and market value of 
equity at the end of 1999. Market-adjusted past return is the average market-adjusted returns for each company during the 3rd 
quarter of 2000. The variable Board Rep-Dem is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company is politically connected 
to the Republicans, a value of minus one if a company is politically connected to the Democrats and a value of zero otherwise. 
The variable Donations Rep-Dem is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company donates more to the Republicans 
than to the Democrats, a value of minus one if a company donates more to the Democrats than to the Republicans, and a value of 
zero otherwise. All models are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The t-values are in parentheses. The symbols $, * and ** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
  
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Constant 3.715 (1.47) 
    5.649 
   (2.19*) 
5.369 
(2.15*) 
3.992 
(1.57) 
2.588 
(1.02) 
3.712 
(1.44) 
3.840 
(1.53) 
6.371 
(2.52*) 
3.458 
(1.35) 
6.261 
(2.37*) 
lnCap -0.361 (1.39) 
-0.570 
(2.15*) 
-0.568 
(2.21*) 
-0.416 
(1.59) 
-0.276 
(1.05) 
-0.312 
(1.19) 
-0.381 
(1.48) 
-0.691 
(2.60*) 
-0.336 
(1.26) 
-0.678 
(2.40*) 
Book to Market 4.118 (4.11**) 
3.089 
(3.04**) 
3.528 
(3.47**) 
3.898 
(3.95**) 
4.272 
(4.20**) 
3.981 
(3.94**) 
4.115 
(4.14**) 
3.324 
(3.29**) 
4.174 
(4.18**) 
3.347 
(3.30**) 
Market-adjusted past  return 0.133 (3.15**) 
0.131 
(3.06**) 
0.128 
(3.01**) 
0.128 
(3.01**) 
0.121 
(2.77**) 
0.143 
(3.33**) 
0.133 
(3.11**) 
0.125 
(2.90**) 
0.135 
(3.14**) 
0.125 
(2.90**) 
Board Rep-Dem 2.101 (3.68**)  
1.992 
(3.47**)        
Donations Rep-Dem  1.745 (3.63**) 
1.626 
(3.43**)        
= 1 if Republican Board    2.977 (4.51**) 
2.353 
(2.94**)  
2.710 
(4.07**) 
2.443 
(3.63**) 
2.668 
(4.02**) 
2.443 
(3.63**) 
= 1 if Republican Board  
      in  Republican State     
1.810 
(1.46)      
= 1 if Democratic Board      -2.853 (2.53**) 
-2.375 
(2.10*) 
-2.353 
(2.08*) 
-2.358 
(2.08*) 
-2.350 
(2.08*) 
= 1 if donates > 50%  
          to Republicans        
1.937 
(3.30**)  
1.908 
(3.10**) 
= 1 if donates > 50%  
          to Democrats         
-1.278 
(1.14) 
-0.243 
(0.21) 
R-squared 0.1200 0.1139 0.1381 0.1218 0.1210 0.1099 0.1333 0.1507 0.1349 0.1508 
Number of Observations 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 
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Table 5: Cross-sectional analysis of Post-Election CARs adjusted by Fama-French 30 industry returns 
 
The sample comprises all S&P 500 companies in the year 2000. Each company is sorted into one of the 30 industries according 
to Fama-French. The dependent variable is the CAR adjusted by the equally-weighted industry return of the Fama-French 30 
industries and calculated over a period (+1,+3) days following the 2000 Presidential Election on Nov. 7, 2000. The explanatory 
variables are the same as in Table 4. All models are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The t-values are in parentheses. The symbols 
$, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
 
 
  
 Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Constant 1.562 (0.70) 
   2.578 
  (1.14) 
2.298 
(1.06) 
1.801 
(0.80) 
1.723 
(0.77) 
1.560 
(0.69) 
1.656 
(0.75) 
2.786 
(1.26) 
1.503 
(0.66) 
12.764 
(1.20) 
lnCap -0.253 (1.10) 
  -0.351 
 (1.51) 
-0.345 
(1.53) 
-0.296 
(1.27) 
-0.286 
(1.23) 
-0.211 
(0.91) 
-0.263 
(1.15) 
-0.401 
(1.74) 
-0.244 
(1.04) 
-0.398 
(1.63) 
Book to Market 1.767 (2.04*) 
   1.119 
  (1.27) 
1.503 
(1.72$) 
1.569 
(1.80$) 
1.548 
(1.78$) 
1.675 
(1.92$) 
1.776 
(2.05*) 
1.423 
(1.62) 
1.800 
(2.08*) 
1.427 
(1.62) 
Market-adjusted past 
return 
0.035 
(0.96) 
   0.037 
  (0.97) 
0.033 
(0.89) 
0.031 
(0.85) 
0.027 
(0.74) 
0.044 
(1.17) 
0.036 
(0.98) 
0.033 
(0.87) 
0.037 
(0.99) 
0.033 
(0.87) 
Board Rep-Dem 1.845 (3.69**)  
1.786 
(3.54**)        
Donations Rep-Dem    0.851     
 (1.99*) 
0.723 
(1.72$)        
=1 if Republican Board    2.288 (3.73**) 
1.507 
(2.09*)  
2.035 
(3.28**) 
1.916 
(3.07**) 
2.026 
(3.26**) 
1.916 
(3.07**) 
= 1 if Republican Board  
     in  Republican State     
2.253 
(2.04*)      
= 1 if Democratic Board      -2.617 (2.79**) 
-2.259 
(2.39*) 
-2.249 
(2.37*) 
-2.252 
(2.37*) 
-2.248 
(2.36*) 
= 1 if donates > 50%  
      to Republicans        
0.964 
(1.66)  
0.859 
(1.58) 
= 1 if donates > 50%  
       to Democrats         
-0.513 
(0.50) 
-0.047 
(0.04) 
R-squared 0.0474 0.0263 0.0522 0.0426 0.0487 0.0388 0.0566 0.0613 0.0570 0.0613 
Number of Observations 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 493 
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Table 6: Timing of Nominations 
 
The table reports the number of nominations of politically connected board members in specific years. The first sorting criterion 
is based on the year in a presidential cycle in which a politically connected board member is nominated. 1st year refers to 
nominations in 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005; 2nd year refers to nominations in 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002; 
3rd year refers to nominations in 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, and 4th year refers to nominations in 1984, 1988, 1992, 
1996, 2000, 2004.The second sorting criterion is whether a board member is nominated in an odd or an even year. The third 
sorting criterion is based on whether the incumbent President is from the Republican or Democratic Party. The fourth and fifth 
criteria are based on whether the Republican or Democratic Party holds the majority in the Senate and House, respectively. The 
calculation of the legislative year starts on Nov. 11th while the Presidential Election year starts on the day after the election. 
 
Year 
Nominations 
Rep Dem Total 
Total 233 116 349 
    
Year in presidential cycle    
1st  year 80 47 127 
2nd year 47 19 66 
3rd year 63 30 93 
4th year 43 20 63 
    
Odd/Even Years    
Odd Years 143 77 220 
Even Years 90 39 129 
    
President    
Republican 113 53 166 
Democratic 120 63 183 
    
Senate Majority    
Republican 118 84 202 
Democratic 115 32 147 
    
House Majority    
Republican 105 82 187 
Democratic 128 34 162 
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Table 7: The announcement effect of the nomination of connected board members 
 
The sample is based on politically connected board members in S&P 500 companies in the years 1996 and 2000. For these board 
members, a search in the Lexis-Nexis database yields 592 announcements of board nominations. The press reports on 243 of 
these announcements contain other price-relevant information such as dividend or earning announcements, share repurchases, or 
M&A activity. Eliminating these announcements yields a final sample of 349 announcements that are used. Companies are sub-
classified by several methods: a) based on the nominated directors’ party affiliation, b) directors former political position, c) the 
order in time of the nomination: first two times a directors is nominated versus third nomination and above, d) the nominee 
worked for the administration and his or her party is the same as that of the president at the nomination day, e) the nominee’s 
party and the party with the majority in house or senate at the nomination day are the same, f) the nominating company is in the 
banking or utilities industries, g) the nominating company is in one of the three industries with the highest levels of government 
shipments as measured by Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) or in any other of their sample industries, h) the relatedness of the 
connection (as detailed earlier),. The CARs for each of the sample portfolios are calculated in the same way as before. In 
parenthesis are t-values. The symbols $, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Connection type Number of Observation 
Equally-weighted 
CAR(%): (0,+1)   
Value-weighted 
CAR(%): (0,+1) 
All companies 349 0.69 (3.88**)   1.20 (9 .41**) 
a) Nominee's party 
      
    Rep nominee (A) 233 0.44 (2.21*) 
 
0.88 (5.54**) 
    Dem nominee (B) 116 1.21 (3.61**)   1.40 (6.42**) 
    difference (A-B)   -0.77 (-3.05**)   -0.52 (-2.88**) 
b) Former career  
      
   Senate, House, Administration (C) 264 0.72 (3.69**) 
 
1.43 (9.60**) 
   Others (D) 85 0.60 (1.37)   0.19 (1.10) 
    difference (C-D) 
 
0.12 (0.29) 
 
1.24 (5.22**) 
c) Nomination order in time               
   1st & 2nd Nomination (E) 178 0.63 (3.16**) 
 
1.70 (10.96**) 
   Over 2nd Nomination (F) 171 0.76 (2.33*) 
 
0.80 (3.30**) 
    difference (E-F)   -0.13 (-0.48)   0.90 (4.44**) 
d)Administration Board and President at nomination           
  Same Party (G) 81 1.00 (2.08*) 
 
2.10 (5.42**) 
  Different Party (H) 96 0.62 (2.20*) 
 
0.80 (3.13**) 
    difference (G-H)   0.38 (0.99)   1.30 (4.03**) 
e) Board party and house/senate party at nomination  
     
  Same Party (I) 175 0.51 (1.52) 
 
0.80 (4.31**) 
  Different Party (J) 174 0.87 (3.94**)   1.44 (8.07**) 
    Difference (I-J) 
 
-0.36 (1.26) 
 
-0.64 (3.52**) 
f) Industry 1             
   Regulated (K) 79 0.82 (2.81**) 
 
1.25 (3.48**) 
   Not Regulated (L) 270 0.66 (2.86**) 
 
1.18 (8.72**) 
    difference (K-L)   0.16 (0.65)   0.07 (0.34) 
g) Industry 2 
 
     
   High Procurement (M) 48 0.70 (1.30) 
 
1.40 (2.86**) 
   Low Procurement (N) 90 0.60 (2.76**)   1.24 (7.09**) 
    difference (M-N) 
 
0.10 (0.32) 
 
0.16 (0.56) 
h) Relatedness             
   Related nominee (O)  108 1.16 (3.89**) 
 
2.28 (11.56**) 
   Not related nominee (P) 241 0.49 (2.09*)   0.77 (4.03**) 
    Difference (O-P)   0.67 (1.82$)   1.51 (5.50**) 
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Table 8: Comparison of announcement effect to matching sample 
 
The original sample is constructed in the same way as in Table 7 and results in 349 announcements. The matching sample is 
constructed by a search in LexisNexis. A matching observation is identified in the following way: For each announcement in a 
company in the original sample, the closest possible announcement of another board member in the same company is chosen. 
This has to occur in a maximum interval of [-3, 3] years around the day of the announcement in the original sample. This search 
yields 319 announcements in the matching sample. Panel a) reports the results for the comparison of this sample. Panel b) 
excludes 32 announcements of CEOs and internal promotions (e.g. CFOs). Panel c) excludes 28 more observations in which 
multiple board members are announced on the same day. The CARs for each of the sample portfolios are calculated in the same 
way as before. In parenthesis are z-values. The symbols $, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
    Number of Equally-weighted Value-weighted 
    Observations CAR(%) : (0,+1) CAR(%) : (0,+1) 
a) Full sample 
   Original Sample (A) 319 0.76 1.28 
(3.98**) (9.63**) 
   Matched Sample (B) 319 0.07 -0.37 
  -0.86 (1.72$) 
   difference (A-B)   0.69 1.65 
   (t-value) (4.70**) (9.21**) 
b) Excluding CEOs and promotions       
   Original Sample (C) 287 0.81 1.38 
(4.18)*** (9.81**) 
   Matched Sample (D) 287 0.1 -0.13 
    -0.71 -0.8 
    difference (C-D) 0.71 1.51 
    (t-value)   (4.19**) (9.93**) 
c) Excluding CEOs, promotions, and multiple board announcements 
   Original Sample (E) 259 0.83 1.47 
(3.99**) (9.98**) 
   Matched Sample (F) 259 -0.09 -0.26 
  -0.33 (1.95$) 
    difference (E-F)   0.92 1.73 
    (t-value)   (3.77**) (12.31**) 
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Table 9: Procurement awards of two sample companies 
 
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics for two of our sample companies that receive procurement awards during the period 
surrounding the 1994 midterm election. Both companies are classified to the “petroleum and natural gas” industry based on the 
Fama-French 30 industry classification.  The value of procurement contracts awarded by the U.S. government between 1990 and 
1998 is found using information provided by FPDS-NG (Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation). Accounting 
variables are from Compustat and are based on values at the end of 1994. The listed board members are those with a former 
political affiliation. For each board member with a former political position we provide information on his/her former position.  
 
 Phillips Petroleum Occidental Petroleum 
Procurement ($million):  1990~1993(A)  120.0 169.5 
Procurement ($million): 1995~1998(B) 289.3 143.7 
Difference (B – A) 169.3 -25.8 
Growth rate (%) 141.1 -15.2 
Market Cap ($million) 8,568.7 6,099.4 
Asset ($million) 11,436.0 17,989.0 
Sales ($million) 12,211.0 9,236.0 
EBITD ($million) 1,752.0 1,539.0 
CAPEX ($million) 1,216.0 1,103.0 
Book-to-market  0.66 0.93 
Connected Board member  
(Nomination year) 
James B. Edwards (1983) 
Lawrence S. Eagleburger (1993) 
Norman R. Augustine (1989) 
Albert Gore (1972) 
Ray R. Irani (1984) 
 
Connected Party Republican Democratic 
 
 
           The political career of connected board members 
 
Board member Year(s) of 
service Position 
Connected 
party 
James B. Edwards  
Lawrence E. Eagleburger 
Norman R. Augustine 
Albert A. Gore  
Ray R. Irani  
1981-82 
1989-93 
1977 
1953-71 
1994 
Secretary of Energy Dept. 
Secretary of State Dept.  
Under Secretary of Defense Dept.  
Senator in Tennessee 
Member of President Clinton's Export Council 
Republican 
Republican 
Republican 
Democratic 
Democratic 
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Table 10: Procurement awards in the United States between 1990 and 2004  
 
Table 10 presents the value and number of procurement contracts awarded by the U.S. government between 1990 and 2004. It 
shows the total value of procurement contracts (in $ million), the number of contracts, and the share of the value awarded by the 
Defense Department, the Energy Department, and NASA. All procurement data are from FPDS-NG (Federal Procurement Data 
System – Next Generation). 
 
 
 
Year Value of Contracts (in $ million) 
Number of  
Contracts 
Share by Department(in % of value) 
Defense Energy NASA Others 
1990 158,150 371,514 66.6 13.4 6.7 13.3 
1991 169,079 422,275 62.5 14.3 8.6 14.6 
1992 159,277 506,592 63.4 13.0 6.2 17.4 
1993 165,534 450,340 58.8 12.0 12.9 16.3 
1994 170,680 459,692 63.6 12.4 5.7 18.3 
1995 165,275 527,085 65.5 11.1 4.4 19.0 
1996 201,876 592,985 63.5 9.4 11.2 16.0 
1997 177,945 537,696 66.0 10.5 3.4 20.0 
1998 183,793 537,246 64.7 10.1 4.1 21.0 
1999 189,312 567,669 64.8 10.7 3.6 20.9 
2000 208,208 613,655 66.5 8.3 2.8 22.3 
2001 213,840 691,568 66.2 9.4 2.5 21.9 
2002 281,240 902,218 67.3 8.0 2.0 22.7 
2003 335,237 1,503,145 65.6 8.9 4.2 21.3 
2004 351,107 2,843,212 68.9 6.1 4.4 20.7 
Mean 208,704 768,459 65.3 10.0 5.2 19.5 
Sum 3,130,553 11,526,892     
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Table 11: Summary statistics for the sample companies  
 
Panel a) of Table 11presents descriptive statistics for the 319 S&P500 companies that obtain government procurement contracts 
of more than $1 million during the 1990 to 1998 period. Panel b) presents descriptive statistics for the 338 S&P500 companies 
that obtain government procurement contracts of more than $1 million during the 1996 to 2004 period. These companies are 
sorted based on the political connections of their board members in 1994 (panel a) and 2000 (panel b). The reported values for 
Market Cap, Assets, Sales, Earning before income tax and depreciation, Capital Expenditure and Book-to-Market Equity Ratio 
are measured as of the end of 1994 (panel a) and 2000 (panel b). A company is classified as politically connected if it has at least 
one board member with the following former position: President, Presidential (Vice-Presidential) Candidate, Senator, Member of 
the House of Representatives, Governor, Mayor, (Assistant) Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Under 
Secretary, Director (CIA, FEMA), Deputy Director (CIA, OMB), Commissioner (IRS, NRC, SSA, CRC, FDA, SEC), 
Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador, Staff (White House, President, Presidential campaign), Chairman of the Party 
Caucus, Chairman or Staff of the Presidential Election campaign, and Chairman or member of the President’s 
Committee/Council.). A company is classified as Rep (Dem) if it has only Republican (Democratic) affiliated board members.   
 
a) 1994 Midterm election 
Variable 
Full Sample 
 
 Rep 
 
Dem 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Market Cap ($ million) 7,534 3,711  11,136 6,718  5,952 3,151 
Asset ($ million) 14,514 4,886  21,825 8,338  13,565 5,109 
Sales ($ million) 8,268 4,507  12,989 8,087  8,191 4,854 
EBITD ($ million) 1,420 623  2,096 1,193  1,186 493 
CAPEX ($ million) 553 220  835 356  491 294 
Book-to-market 0.57 0.51 
 
0.57 0.47 
 
0.55 0.55 
No. of companies 319 
 
79 
 
36 
 
b) 2000 Presidential election 
Variable 
Full Sample 
 
 
Rep 
 
Dem 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Market Cap ($ million) 29,882 8,925  41,189 12,532  23,384 10,013 
Asset ($ million) 32,984 10,077  25,333 12,372  73,934 18,142 
Sales ($ million) 14,663 7,156  18,285 10,070  19,965 9,260 
EBITD ($ million) 3,024 1,298  3,555 2,047  4,321 1,841 
CAPEX ($ million) 1,073 332  1,152 584  1,558 659 
Book-to-market 0.49 0.38 
 
0.40 0.30 
 
0.65 0.54 
No. of companies 338 
 
54 
 
35 
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Table 12: Tenure and timing of nomination of political boards 
 
Panel a) of Table 12 reports the mean, median, and maximum period of time (in years) between the nomination of a politically 
connected board member and the 1994 midterm election and the 2000 presidential election, respectively. Panel b) presents the 
number of nominations of politically connected board members in specific years. The first sorting criterion is based on the year in 
a presidential cycle in which a politically connected board member is nominated. 1st year refers to nominations in the next year 
after a presidential election (e.g. 1981, 1985, 1989); 2nd year refers to nominations in the second year after a presidential election 
(e.g. 1982, 1986, 1990); 3rd year refers to nominations in the third year after a presidential election (e.g. 1983, 1987, 1991), and 
4th year refers to nominations in the fourth year after a presidential election (e.g. 1984, 1988, 1992). The second sorting criterion 
is based on whether a board member is nominated in an odd or an even year. The third sorting criterion is based on whether the 
incumbent President is from the Republican or Democratic Party. The fourth and fifth criteria are based on whether the 
Republican or Democratic Party holds the majority in the Senate and House, respectively. In election years, the calculation of the 
year starts on the day after the election; in non-election years it starts on Nov. 11th. 
 
a) Tenure of connected boards before the 1994 election and the 2000 election 
 
1994 Election 2000 Election 
All  
Rep Dem Total Rep Dem Total 
Number of nominations of  
connected board members 152 71 223 91 57 148 371 
 Mean 5.23 7.22 5.86 5.77 5.03 5.49 5.71 
Tenure Median 3 6 4 5 3 4 4 
 Max 20 22 22 14 23 23 23 
 
b) Nomination timing of connected boards 
Nomination Rep Dem Total 
Total 244 127 371 
Year in presidential cycle    
1st  year 105 43 148 
2nd year 55 24 79 
3rd year 50 32 82 
4th year 34 28 62 
Odd/Even Years    
Odd Years 155 75 230 
Even Years 89 52 141 
President    
Republican 109 58 167 
Democratic 135 69 204 
Senate Majority    
Republican 69 65 134 
Democratic 175 62 237 
House Majority    
Republican 46 42 88 
Democratic 198 85 283 
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Table 13: Value of procurement contracts for sample companies 
 
Panel a) of Table 13 summarizes the value of procurement contracts (in $million) for the sample of 319 S&P500 companies 
between 1990 and 1998. Panel b) summarizes the value of procurement contracts (in $million) for the sample of 338 S&P500 
companies between 1996 and 2004. A company is classified as Rep (Dem) if it has only Republican (Democratic) affiliated board 
members. Based on the political connections of their board members, the sample companies are sorted into three groups: 
Republican, Democratic, and Others. The left columns report the sum of the procurement contracts for all companies, while the 
right columns report the average of the procurement contracts. 
 
a) 1994 Midterm election 
Year 
Sum of procurement contracts ($ million)  Mean of procurement contracts ($ million) 
Full Sample  Rep  Dem  Others 
 
Full Sample  Rep  Dem Others 
1990~1998 475,632 297,913 31,749 145,970 
 
1,491 3,771 882 716 
1990~1993 (A) 187,829 113,127 15,314 59,387  589 1,432 425 291 
1995~1998 (B) 233,594 152,954 12,611 68,029  732 1,936 350 333 
Difference (B-A) 45,765 39,826 -2,703 8,641  143 504 -75 42 
Growth rate (%) 24.4 35.2 -17.6 14.6  24.4 35.2 -17.6 14.6 
No. of companies 319 79 36 204 
 
319 79 36 204 
 
 
b) 2000 Presidential election 
Year 
Sum of procurement contracts ($ million)  Mean of procurement contracts ($ million) 
Full Sample Rep Dem Others 
 
Full Sample Rep Dem Others 
1996~2004 755,883 211,037 27,132 517,713 
 
2,236 3,908 775 2,079 
1996~1999 (A) 270,013 80,725 10,876 178,412  799 1,495 311 717 
2001~2004 (B) 403,164 108,995 12,057 282,112  1,193 2,018 344 1,133 
Difference (B-A) 133,151 28,270 1,181 103,700  394 524 34 416 
Growth rate (%) 49.3 35.0 10.9 58.1  49.3 35.0 10.9 58.1 
No. of companies 338 54 35 249 
 
338 54 35 249 
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Table 14: Summary statistics for the sample companies by categories 
 
The 319 sample companies in panel a) are classified into one of five groups based on the difference in the amount of procurement 
contracts that they receive in the four-year period before 1994 and the four-year period after 1994. The 338 sample companies in 
panel b) are classified into one of five groups based on the difference in the amount of procurement contracts that they receive in 
the four-year period before 2000 and the four-year period after 2000. Each of the five groups comprises the same number of 
companies (with the exception of group 1 in the 1994 sample and groups 1, 2 in the 2000 sample), with group 1 comprising the 
companies with the lowest dollar difference and group 5 comprising the companies with the highest dollar difference in 
procurement contracts across the two time periods. 
 
a) 1994 Midterm election 
Group 
Number of companies 
 
Mean of difference amount ($1,000) 
Rep Dem Others Sum 
 
Rep Dem Others Total 
1 15 12 36 63 
 
-210,320 -649,105 -135,099 -250,915 
2 7 9 48 64 
 
-8,556 -7,543 -8,026 -8,016 
3 14 4 46 64 
 
809 641 363 478 
4 21 7 36 64 
 
13,414 23,757 14,263 15,023 
5 22 4 38 64 
 
1,943,093 1,246,390 351,570 954,583 
Full 
sample 79 36 204 319 
 
504,131 -75,076 42,358 143,463 
 
b) 2000 Presidential election 
Group 
Number of companies 
 
Mean of difference amount($1,000) 
Rep Dem Others Sum 
 
Rep Dem Others Total 
1 8 11 48 67 
 
-61,217 -316,145 -302,384 -275,847 
2 4 7 56 67 
 
-2,848 -3,680 -2,492 -2,637 
3 9 7 52 68 
 
2,223 2,765 2,791 2,713 
4 20 3 45 68 
 
22,228 46,554 25,228 25,286 
5 13 7 48 68 
 
2,177,392 646,535 2,439,035 2,204,493 
Full 
Sample 54 35 249 338 
 
523,510 33,754 416,466 393,938 
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Table 15: Cross-section analysis for the change in procurement contracts of 1994 sample 
 
The sample consists of 319 companies in the S&P 500 in the year 1994. The dependent variable is the log of the absolute value of 
the change in the sum of procurement contracts between 1990-1993 and 1995-1998; this variable is multiplied by 1 if the change 
is positive and -1 if it is negative. lnCap is the log of the company’s market capitalization. BM is the ratio of the book value and 
market value of equity. Hf_index is the Herfindahl index, which is based on the sales amount in the 2-digit SIC industry of the 
company. CAPEX/Sales is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. EBITD/Assets is the ratio of earnings before income tax and 
depreciation to assets. CostGood/Sales is the ratio of cost of goods sold to sales. All control variables are from COMPUSTAT 
and are measured at the end of 1994. dRep is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company is politically connected to 
the Republicans and zero otherwise. dDem is defined similarly. SalesGrowth is the growth rate in sales between 1990-1991 and 
1992-1993. dDefense is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company has political board members with a defense 
career. dCongress is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company has political board members with a former career in 
congress. dHeadquarter is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the board is connected to the party that wins the 1994 
senate election in the company’s headquarter state. FF30 industry includes dummy variables for each industry according to the 
Fama-French 30-industry classification. Six industries is a dummy variables that takes a value of 1 if a company operates in food, 
health, oil, utility, finance, or business supplies according to the Fama-French 30-industry classification and a value of zero 
otherwise. dDonRep is dummy variable that takes the value of one if a company donates more to Republicans than to Democrats 
in the 1994 elections, and dDonDem is defined similarly. All models are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The t-values are in 
parentheses. The symbols $, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
lnCap 0.005 0.274 0.043 0.093 0.018 0.007 0.048 -0.004 -0.458 -0.062 0.222 
 [0.01] [0.74] [0.11] [0.24] [0.04] [0.02] [0.12] [0.01] [1.08] [0.16] [0.50] 
BM 1.092 1.125 1.086 0.829 0.875 0.971 0.915 0.926 1.123 0.987 0.807 
 [0.94] [0.97] [0.95] [0.72] [0.75] [0.78] [0.74] [0.76] [1.07] [0.74] [0.66] 
Hf_index 0.206** 0.205** 0.205** 0.209** 0.209** 0.209** 0.211** 0.203** 0.216** 0.211** 0.212** 
 [3.70] [3.52] [3.60] [3.66] [3.67] [3.74] [3.79] [3.62] [3.02] [3.57] [3.71] 
Capex/Sales 0.136* 0.135* 0.133* 0.142* 0.141* 0.149* 0.137* 0.144* 0.069 0.144* 0.146* 
 [2.38] [2.32] [2.29] [2.42] [2.40] [2.56] [2.30] [2.45] [1.08] [2.40] [2.46] 
EBITD/Assets    -0.045 -0.058 -0.036 -0.031 -0.022   -0.049 
    [0.75] [0.99] [0.59] [0.50] [0.35]   [0.81] 
CostGood/Sales    -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001   -0.002 
    [0.18] [0.33] [0.17] [0.14] [0.03]   [0.08] 
dRep 2.933**  2.599** 2.539** 2.664** 2.500* 2.684* 3.842** 2.912** 2.429* 2.601** 
 [3.15]  [2.72] [2.63] [2.76] [2.46] [2.55] [3.33] [3.07] [2.49] [2.70] 
dDem  -2.824* -2.092$ -2.240$ -2.207$    -2.305$ -2.183$ -2.256$ 
  [2.40] [1.73] [1.82] [1.81]    [1.72] [1.73] [1.82] 
SalesGrowth     0.878*       
     [2.24]       
dRep*dDefense      2.091      
      [1.05]      
dRep*dCongress       0.987     
       [0.56]     
dRep*dHeadquarter        -2.061    
        [1.29]    
FF 30 industry         yes   
Six industries          yes  
dDonRep           -0.690 
           [0.57] 
dDonDem           -0.760 
           [0.52] 
Constant -2.942 -4.117 -2.904 -2.290 -1.488 -2.205 -2.557 -2.441 2.857 -2.224 -3.287 
 [0.89] [1.26] [0.88] [0.57] [0.37] [0.55] [0.63] [0.61] [0.66] [0.65] [0.75] 
Observations 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 319 
R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.08 
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Table 16: Cross-section analysis for the change in procurement contracts of 2000 sample 
 
The sample consists of 338 companies in the S&P 500 in the year 2000. The dependent variable is the log of the absolute value of 
the change in the sum of procurement contracts between 1996-1999 and 2001-2004; this figure is multiplied by 1 if the change is 
positive and multiplied by -1 if it is negative. lnCap is the log of the company’s market capitalization. BM is the ratio of book to 
market value of equity. Hf_index is the Herfindahl index, which is based on the sales amount in the 2-digit SIC industry of the 
company. CAPEX/Sales is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. EBITD/Assets is the ratio of earnings before income tax and 
depreciation to assets. CostGood/Sales is the ratio of cost of goods sold to sales. All control variables are from COMPUSTAT 
and are measured at the end of 2000. dRep is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company is politically connected 
only to the Republicans and a value of zero otherwise. dDem is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company is 
politically connected only to the Democrats and a value of zero otherwise. SalesGrowth is the growth rate in sales between 1996-
1997 and 1998-1999. dDefense is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company has political board members with a 
defense career. dGovernment is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a company has political board members with a 
former career in the government. dHeadquarter is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the board member is connected to 
the party that wins the majority in the company’s headquarter state in the 2000 election. FF30 industry includes dummy variables 
for each industry according to the Fama-French 30-industry classification. Six industries is a dummy variables that takes a value 
of 1 if a company operates in food, health, oil, utility, finance, or business supplies according to the Fama-French 30-industry 
classification and a value of zero otherwise. dDonRep is dummy variable that takes the value of one if a company donates more 
to Republicans than to Democrats in the 2000 elections, and dDonDem is defined similarly. All models are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. The t-values are in parentheses. The symbols $, * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
lnCap -0.238 -0.129 -0.223 -0.264 -0.278 -0.282 -0.275 -0.274 -0.208 -0.287 -0.319 
 [0.76] [0.41] [0.71] [0.82] [0.87] [0.88] [0.85] [0.85] [0.57] [0.89] [0.84] 
BM -4.122** -4.042** -4.046** -4.061** -3.894** -4.100** -4.096** -4.092** -3.320** -3.426** -4.215** 
 [4.45] [4.32] [4.34] [3.91] [3.79] [3.96] [3.95] [3.94] [2.94] [3.51] [3.88] 
Hf_index 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.008 0.015 0.016 0.016 -0.019 -0.018 0.006 
 [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.17] [0.11] [0.20] [0.22] [0.21] [0.18] [0.23] [0.09] 
Capex/Sales -0.096* -0.102* -0.095* -0.101* -0.117** -0.102* -0.102* -0.104* -0.062 -0.078$ -0.100* 
 [2.33] [2.39] [2.27] [2.39] [2.78] [2.46] [2.46] [2.51] [1.41] [1.80] [2.35] 
EBITD/Assets    -0.033 -0.017 -0.031 -0.031 -0.033   -0.028 
    [0.67] [0.33] [0.63] [0.62] [0.66]   [0.55] 
CostGood/Sales    -0.017 -0.011 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019   -0.016 
    [0.84] [0.53] [0.88] [0.88] [0.93]   [0.75] 
dRep 2.454*  2.380* 2.474* 2.458* 2.472* 2.418$ 2.001$ 2.890** 2.653** 2.364* 
 [2.59]  [2.49] [2.57] [2.54] [2.48] [1.66] [1.70] [2.81] [2.63] [2.43] 
dDem  -1.037 -0.629 -0.626 -0.582    -0.670 -0.272 -0.704 
  [0.78] [0.47] [0.46] [0.43]    [0.46] [0.20] [0.52] 
SalesGrowth     0.763$       
     [1.89]       
dRep*dDefense      0.706      
      [0.27]      
dRep*dGovernment       0.196     
       [0.11]     
dRep*dHeadquarter        1.474    
        [0.87]    
FF 30 industry         yes   
Six industries          yes  
dDon_rep           0.315 
           [0.32] 
dDon_dem           2.229 
           [1.25] 
Constant 6.320* 5.827$ 6.223* 8.132* 7.415* 8.275* 8.193* 8.298* 5.299 6.590* 8.389$ 
 [2.08] [1.91] [2.05] [2.16] [1.97] [2.19] [2.17] [2.20] [1.11] [2.12] [1.97] 
Observations 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.11 0.10 
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Table 17: Placebo event year test for the change in procurement contracts of 1997 sample 
 
The sample consists of 345 companies in the S&P 500 in the year 1996. The dependent variable is the log of the absolute value of 
the change in the sum of procurement contracts between 1995-1997 and 1998-2000; this figure is multiplied by 1 if the change is 
positive and multiplied by -1 if the change is negative. lnCap is the log of the company’s market capitalization. BM is the ratio of 
the book value of equity to the market value of equity. Hf_index is the Herfindahl index, which is based on the sales amount in 
the 2-digit SIC industry in which a company operates. CAPEX/Sales is the ratio of capital expenditure to sales. EBITD/Assets is 
the ratio of earnings before income tax and depreciation to assets. CostGood/Sales is the ratio of cost of goods sold to sales. All 
control variables are from COMPUSTAT and are measured at the end of 1997. dRep is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if a company is politically connected only to the Republicans and a value of zero otherwise. dDem is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if a company is politically connected only to the Democrats and a value of zero otherwise. SalesGrowth is 
the growth rate in sales between 1994-1995 and 1996-1997. FF30 industry includes dummy variables for each industry according 
to the Fama-French 30-industry classification. Six industries is a dummy variables that takes a value of 1 if a company operates 
in food, health, oil, utility, finance, or business supplies according to the Fama-French 30-industry classification and a value of 
zero otherwise. All models are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. The t-values are in parentheses. The symbols $, * and ** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
lnCap 0.936** 0.961** 0.930** 0.763* 1.047** 
 [2.83] [2.93] [2.80] [2.22] [2.67] 
BM -1.104 -0.974 -1.095 -1.017 -2.569 
 [0.69] [0.63] [0.68] [0.63] [1.26] 
Hf_index 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.022 
 [0.13] [0.12] [0.14] [0.03] [0.34] 
Capex/Sales -0.088$ -0.088$ -0.088$ -0.089$ -0.108 
 [1.75] [1.76] [1.74] [1.82] [1.48] 
EBITD/Assets 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003   
 [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.06]   
CostGood/Sales -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.001   
 [0.09] [0.00] [0.07] [0.05]   
dRep 0.627   0.663 0.726 1.014 
 [0.67]   [0.70] [0.76] [1.01] 
dDem   0.267 0.409 0.613 0.200 
   [0.20] [0.30] [0.46] [0.14] 
SalesGrowth       2.605*   
       [2.00]   
FF 30 industry         yes 
Constant -7.330$ -7.622* -7.376$ -6.623$ -11.143** 
 [1.90] [1.99] [1.91] [1.70] [2.61] 
Observations 345 345 345 345 345 
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11 
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Table 18: Distribution of sample companies across the Fama-French 30 industries  
 
 
FF 30 Industries 
1994 2000 
Rep Dem Others Sum Rep Dem Others Sum 
Food Products 7 2 7 16 6  8 14 
Beer & Liquor 1   1   3 3 
Tobacco Products   2 2 1   1 
Recreation 3  2 5 1  1 2 
Printing and Publishing 3 4 5 12 1 1 7 9 
Consumer Goods 3 2 9 14 3 1 8 12 
Apparel   5 5  1 1 2 
Healthcare, Medical Equipment,  
      Pharmaceutical Products 5 2 12 19 6  20 26 
Chemicals 1  7 8 2  7 9 
Textiles   1 1   2 2 
Construction and Construction Materials 1 2 12 15 2 1 8 11 
Steel Works Etc 2 1 4 7 1  6 7 
Fabricated Products and Machinery 3 3 11 17 2  9 11 
Electrical Equipment 1  2 3 1 1 3 5 
Automobiles and Trucks 2 2 8 12  1 9 10 
Aircraft, ships, and railroad equipment 2  3 5   7 7 
Precious Metals, Non-Metallic, and  
        Industrial Metal Mining   2 2   1 1 
Coal 1  1 2     
Petroleum and Natural Gas 8 3 9 20 3 3 9 15 
Utilities 5 2 20 27 5 6 18 29 
Communication 1 1 4 6 1 3 8 12 
Personal and Business Services 4 2 8 14 3 1 21 25 
Business Equipment 2 3 19 24 3 5 36 44 
Business Supplies and Shipping Containers 5 1 7 13 4 2 7 13 
Transportation 1 2 5 8 1  5 6 
Wholesale 1 1 4 6   6 6 
Retail 3 1 6 10  1 14 15 
Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels 1  4 5 1  1 2 
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, Trading 11 3 20 34 4 7 22 33 
Everything Else 1  5 6 3 1 2 6 
Total 78 37 204 319 54 35 249 338 
 
  
  
Figure 1: Distribution of politically connected companies across the Fama
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